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             INTRODUCTION
  
  On the wall of the Legacy Museum in Montgomery, Alabama, the visitor’s 
eye is drawn to a striking photograph of black men who appear to be sleeping—or 
trying to sleep—side by side.1 Crocheted together like a human blanket, one man’s 
head next to his neighbor’s feet, they cover the sleeping surface such that it is 
impossible to tell whether they are in the wooden galley of a slave ship, the packed 
dirt of a refugee camp, or the cement floor of a jail cell. If the visitor passed by 
quickly without reading the caption accompanying the photo, she would likely 
assume that the image was related to the slave trade: the word “kidnapped” appears 
prominently in the exhibit. One thing is certain: the men in the photo are suffering, 
and their suffering evokes in the visitor a visceral mix of horror and pity.  
The photo was originally published by the New York Times on November 
6, 2005. It appeared on the front page of the paper and accompanied a cover story 
about prison overcrowding in Africa.2 The article focused on Malawi’s Maula 
                                           
* Clinical Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  I would like to thank my clinic students, who have 
recognized the humanity of their clients and worked tirelessly to protect their dignity and promote 
their legal rights. I have obtained their express permission to include the excerpts from student 
journals reproduced below. I would also like to thank the clinic’s Malawian partners, especially the 
Paralegal Advisory Services Institute, for the many lessons they have taught me over the years. 
Finally, my thanks to colleagues at Cornell and Drexel law schools, who provided helpful comments 
on earlier drafts of this article, and to Tayler Woelke for her assistance with research and editing. 
1 The photo is also prominent on the museum’s home page.  See Equal Just. Initiative, The Legacy 
Museum:  From Enslavement to Mass Incarceration, https://museumandmemorial.eji.org/museum 
(last visited July 17, 2018). 
2 Michael Wines, The Forgotten of Africa, Wasting Away in Jails Without Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
6, 2005),  https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/06/world/africa/the-forgotten-of-africa-wasting-
away-in-jails-without-trial.html.  
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prison, where the prison cells were so crowded that men slept on their sides, head 
to toe, with scarcely a millimeter of space between them. Once each night, an 
inmate would give the signal for everyone to turn over simultaneously; apart from 
that fleeting opportunity to stretch and turn, the crush of bodies surrounding them 
prevented all movement.3 Each cellblock, designed for 50–60 prisoners, contained 
approximately 150 men. They spent fourteen hours a day locked in the cell, where 
they shared a single toilet. Without clean water and soap, prisoners were unable to 
fend off disease, and many lost their lives.4  
 The Times explained that the overcrowding was attributable, in large part, 
to the backlog of pretrial, or “remand” cases.5 Malawi has no jail system. Rather, 
prisoners awaiting trial are housed in the same prison as convicted prisoners, 
separated only by a flimsy wire fence.6 Prisoners receive one meal per day 
consisting of boiled maize flour; occasionally, it comes with beans or peas.7 
Sometimes they receive no food at all.8 Many of them await trial for years without 
ever speaking to a lawyer. Missing court files cause further delays; without a 
computerized case-tracking system, many prisoners simply get lost in the system. 
 Like many others, I was appalled by the conditions depicted in the photo 
and read the accompanying article with interest. At the time, I was preparing to take 
a new job directing the international human rights clinic at Northwestern University 
Pritzker School of Law. I was looking for potential clinical projects and wondered 
whether the clinic could assist with prison overcrowding in Malawi. I mentioned 
my interest to Tom Geraghty, the director of Northwestern’s Bluhm Legal Clinic. 
As it happened, Tom knew someone who was working in Malawi’s prisons with 
the international non-governmental organization Penal Reform International (PRI). 
He put us in touch. A little more than a year later, I headed to Malawi with six of 
my students after putting together a fairly free-form work plan with PRI’s 
assistance.   
I have since returned to Malawi twenty times, bringing more than 60 
students and 15 volunteer lawyers.9  Our work has led to the release of over 290 
prisoners, most of whom had risked execution; others faced a lingering death from 
disease and malnutrition in Malawi’s prisons. The purpose of this article, however, 
is not to trumpet our clinic’s hard-won achievements, but to discuss some of the 
                                           
3 Id.    
4 A 2005 study found that tuberculosis, scabies, diarrhea, sexually transmitted infections, coughs, 
malnutrition, malaria and bilharzia were common diseases among the prison population. See FIDELIS 
EDGE KANYONGOLO, MALAWI: JUSTICE SECTOR AND THE RULE OF LAW 124 (2006). 
5 Wines, supra note 3. 
6 Vera Mlangazuwa Chirwa (Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa), 
Prisons in Malawi, A.C.H.R. Ser. IV no. 9 (June 28, 2001). 
7 Rachel Banning-Lover, Behind the Walls of Malawi’s Harshest Prisons—In Pictures, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 29, 2016, 5:21 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/gallery/2016/jul/29/malawis-harshest-prisons-humanitarian-msf. See Olivier 
De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Mission to Malawi: 12–22 July, End of 
Mission Statement, at 13 (July 22, 2013). 
8 See De Schutter, supra note 7, at 13.  Masangano v Att’y Gen., High Court of Malawi [MWHC] 
31 (Nov. 9, 2009) (Malawi).  
9 In 2014, I began teaching an international human rights clinic at Cornell Law School, and brought 
the Malawi project with me. 




complex ethical, moral, and political questions raised by my clinic’s legal advocacy 
on behalf of Malawian prisoners.10 By describing scenarios from our fieldwork, I 
seek to illustrate the fraught strategic judgments and moral choices that permeate a 
certain kind of human rights advocacy. My analysis of these scenarios draws not 
only from the fields of legal ethics, critical theory, and law reform, but also from 
the observations of development economists.    
This essay is guided by the concept of “reflective equilibrium,” a process 
that “involves going back and forth between our beliefs in the form of carefully 
considered judgments in response to a range of cases, the ethical principles that 
underlie those judgments, and the general theoretical considerations that support 
the ethical principles.”11  At a more prosaic level, it is an attempt to put into 
narrative form a sometimes disjointed and confusing amalgamation of experiences.  
As Kennedy notes, this gives rise to certain narrative choices that may ultimately 
obscure “the muddle of practice, experienced as a mix of intuition, confusion, and 
quick thinking”12 that sometimes characterizes human rights lawyering. But 
narrative choices are essential to any good story, and this article is, in essence, a 
tale about a human rights lawyer and her students who embarked on a journey of 
human rights advocacy in a foreign legal system. Along the way, they made good 
and bad decisions, were able to escape harm, and learned valuable lessons about 
their limits and potential. It is these lessons, many of them painful, that inspired this 
writing.  
Part I of this article provides a short overview of Malawi’s legal system. 
Part II is divided into three sections that describe some of the moral dilemmas and 
cultural challenges I have encountered during my field work with students. The first 
of these involves an ethical problem that arose during my initial visit to Malawi as 
a new clinical professor in 2007. The second addresses the clinic’s role in 
perpetuating a donor-driven, aid-dependent legal culture. The third illustrates the 
very real dangers of cultural incompetence.  
Part III lays out why, despite the imperfect nature of our clinical work in 
Malawi, the project could serve as a useful model for sustained human rights 
advocacy—particularly in the clinical context. Here, I describe a twelve-year 
project spearheaded by the clinic to obtain new sentencing hearings for 
approximately 175 death-sentenced prisoners after a critical change in the law 
allowed for the presentation of mitigating evidence at sentencing. I incorporate 
some of the lessons learned from scholars in the field of justice reform to support 
                                           
10 This is not an easy article to write, in part because it exposes my own inadequacy in navigating 
the cultural barriers that separate me from my Malawian colleagues, and in part because it reveals 
my shortcomings as a clinical professor. But such is the nature of critical reflection, and it would 
be of little interest to anyone if the article failed to explore my ambivalence about the legacy of 
our multi-year engagement in Malawi. In this, I am the embodiment of the ambivalent human 
rights advocate described by Peter Rosenblum in his seminal article on our profession. Peter 
Rosenblum, Teaching Human Rights: Ambivalent Activism, Multiple Discourses, and Lingering 
Dilemmas, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 301, 304-305 (2002). 
11 W. BRADLEY WENDEL, ETHICS AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 22 (2014).  
12 David Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1377, 1379 (1985). 
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an incremental, problem-based approach to clinical work in the Global South.13  I 
explain how the Malawi project has provided valuable learning opportunities for 
students, even though my pedagogical method consciously diverges from the 
favored clinical teaching model that emphasizes student autonomy and control over 
individual cases. I also address critiques of human rights advocacy in general, and 
human rights clinics in particular, in describing why I believe this model strikes an 
appropriate balance between pedagogical objectives and service to an 
underrepresented community. I conclude that the long-term nature of the clinic’s 
collaboration with local partners in Malawi, combined with our focus on individual 
client representation, have allowed us to maximize the impact of the project on 
students and clients alike.14 
 
       I. MALAWI FACTS AND FIGURES15 
Malawi is a gorgeous, land-locked country approximately the size of 
Pennsylvania sandwiched between Tanzania to the north, Zambia to the west, and 
Mozambique to the east and south. One long border lies adjacent to Lake Malawi, 
the third largest lake in Africa and the ninth largest lake in the world.16 Much of the 
country lies in the upland valley that is the southern end of the East African Rift 
Valley. The climate is pleasant in most regions of the country, without the 
punishing humidity of the coast. Since the fall of dictator Hastings Kamuzu Banda 
in 1994, the country has enjoyed twenty-five years of peace and relative stability, 
                                           
13 In my view, “Global South” is the best term for countries that used to be referred to as “less 
developed” or “developing, for the same reasons identified by Hammergren.”  See LINN A. 
HAMMERGREN, JUSTICE REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT 5 (2014).  At the same time, I’m cognizant 
of the drawbacks to this terminology identified by Sarah Jackson.  She notes that while she uses 
the term, she does so “with full recognition that this binary distinction is lacking. It negates power 
imbalances between countries within the Global North and Global South, concealing inequality, 
downplaying class and its intersection with gender, race, age and so on. It is a top-down 
construct.” Sarah Jackson, FROM CHARITY TO TRANSFORMATIVE SOLIDARITY – THE CHANGING 
PLACE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS ECO-SYSTEM 4 ( Aug. 
28, 2018). 
14 In my research for this article, I revisited some of the classic critiques of the human rights 
movement.  One in particular I found inspirational and maddening in equal measure:  David 
Kennedy’s Spring Break, published in 1985. Kennedy’s piece was inspirational in its use of 
narrative storytelling techniques to reflect on his experience during a human rights investigation in 
Uruguay. It is maddening to the extent that Kennedy uses what was, in essence, a three-day trip to 
a foreign country as a launching pad for an essay that aims to expose the fraught moral choices 
confronting a human rights advocate. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1377. 
15 This thumbnail sketch fails to do justice to the complexity of Malawian culture and political 
development. Nevertheless, it attempts to highlight the more salient facts relevant to this paper 
without falling into the common pitfalls of Western writing about Africa. See Binyavanga Wainaina, 
How to Write About Africa, GRANTA, (Jan. 19, 2006), https://granta.com/how-to-write-about-
africa/.   
16 Scientists estimate that more than 1,000 different species live in Lake Malawi, many of them 
endemic. (This is more than the total number of species found in all of the lakes and rivers of Europe 
and North America combined.) See 10 Largest Lakes in the World, WORLDATLAS, 
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/10-largest-lakes-in-the-world.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).  




despite an ethnically diverse population and struggling economy.17 It boasts a 
reputation as one of the friendliest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, proudly 
displaying the moniker “The Warm Heart of Africa” in tourist brochures. Residents 
are generally pleasant to outsiders, although quite reserved in rural areas. It is one 
of the most densely populated African countries, with a total population of 
approximately 18.6 million.18 
Malawi is also the sixth poorest nation in the world, measured by gross 
domestic product at purchasing power parity.19 The per capita gross national 
income is $320.20 More than seventy percent of the population survives on just 
$1.90 per day.21 According to the Special Rapporteur on Food, one-fourth of 
Malawi’s population is “ultra-poor,” meaning that they have an income “below the 
estimated cost of food providing the minimum daily recommended calorie 
intake.”22 Simply put, they don’t have enough to eat. About fifty percent of children 
show signs of chronic malnutrition, including stunted growth and wasting.23  
Malawi’s justice sector is largely dependent on outside aid to maintain 
operations.24 Government allocations to the Ministry of Justice are grossly 
inadequate. A 2006 review of the justice sector noted that because of underfunding, 
justice sector institutions “cannot obtain material resources as basic as texts of 
legislation, law reports, vehicles, typewriters, computers and stationery—or even 
adequately maintained buildings.”25 A lawyer’s attempt to file a simple legal 
document can be stymied by her inability to find a functioning photocopy machine 
that has sufficient paper and toner.26    
For Malawian lawyers, it can be difficult to ascertain precisely what the law 
is. Legislation may be published months after passage, and until recently was only 
available in hard copy. Judicial decisions are not routinely published. Record 
                                           
17 James Chavula, 19-Year-Old Prayer for Peace, THE NATION (May 15, 2013), 
http://mwnation.com/19-year-old-prayer-for-peace/.  
18 WORLD BANK, MALAWI COUNTRY INDICATORS, https://data.worldbank.org/country/malawi (last 
visited June 7, 2018). 
19 Jonathan Gregson, Poorest Countries in the World, GLOBAL FINANCE (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/the-poorest-countries-in-the-world?page=12. 
According to Global Finance magazine, “PPP takes into account the relative cost of living and the 
inflation rates of countries, rather than using just exchange rates, which may distort the real 
differences in income.” Valentina Pasquali, The Poorest Countries in the World, GLOBAL FINANCE 
(Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/the-poorest-countries-in-the-
world [http://archive.is/jgOag].  
20 WORLD BANK,  supra note 18. 
21 WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND EQUITY DATA PORTAL: MALAWI, 
http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/MWI (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). 
22 De Schutter, supra note 8, at 2. 
23 Id. 
24 See KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 10. 
25 Id.  
26 Once, in preparing for a training workshop, I went to three separate shops offering 
photocopying services.  The copiers were broken in the first two.  In the third, the copier was 
functioning, but the shop lacked electricity to power it.  This is by no means unusual.  For a good 
overview of the infrastructure problems and resource constraints that pervade many legal systems 
in the Global South, see Hammergren, supra note 13 at 28-29. 
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keeping as a whole is exceedingly poor.27 Case-related information is manually 
transcribed, and filing systems are haphazard at best.28  
The legal aid system cannot begin to meet the needs of individuals detained 
on criminal charges. As of 2006, there were approximately 180 lawyers in private 
practice in the entire country, most of whom handled civil matters exclusively.29 
The only certified law school in the country graduates approximately 30–35 
students a year30—although during recent years, graduation was delayed as a result 
of lengthy student and faculty strikes.31 Over the last twelve years, the population 
has increased by more than 4 million while the number of lawyers has increased by 
at most 300.32 
At any given time, there are anywhere from 7–20 legal aid lawyers in the 
entire country.33 Legal Aid is grossly under-funded, particularly when compared to 
the Director of Public Prosecutions, whose budget in 2006 was more than twice the 
amount allotted for Legal Aid.34 Legal Aid lawyers spend most of their time on 
civil matters,35 and often lack the time, resources, and motivation to visit 
prospective clients in prison. The vast majority of prisoners never speak to a lawyer 
and are unrepresented at trial.36 Although Malawi’s Constitution provides that an 
individual accused of a crime has the right “where it is required in the interests of 
justice to be provided with legal representation at the expense of the State,”37 in 
practice, the State only provides legal aid in homicide cases.38 Legal aid lawyers 
                                           
27 KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 11.  
28 In 2013, a volunteer lawyer helped the clinic search for the files of approximately 192 prisoners 
who had been given mandatory death sentences. The file room of one of the High Courts was located 
in an unused latrine where files were stacked on the floor. After searching for seven months, he was 
only able to locate 86 of the 192 case files. The reliance on paper files, and the lack of systematic 
case tracking methods, are commonplace in much of the Global South.  See Hammergren, supra n. 
13, at 26. 
29 David McQuoid-Mason, Assessment of Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in Malawi, June 
2006, ¶¶7.1–7.2 (on file with author).  
30 Id. at ¶7.5. 
31 See, e.g., Hummy Humphreys, Breaking News: Chancellor College Has Been Shut Down, NEWS 
WATCH REVIEWS (July 19, 2016), http://newswatchreviews.com/breaking-news-chancellor-
college-has-been-shut-down/; Malawi: Court Overrules President on Lecturer Strike, U. WORLD 
NEWS (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=
20110326123235692. 
32 WORLD BANK, MALAWI COUNTRY INDICATORS, https://data.worldbank.org/country/malawi (last 
visited June 7, 2018); Membership Directory, MALAWI LAW SOCIETY, http://malawilawsociety.
net/index.php/membership/membership-directory/file, (last visited June 7, 2018).  
33 In 2006, McQuoid-Mason noted that there were five lawyers in the southern region, and nine in 
the central region—of whom four had been in the office for less than four months. Supra note 29, 
at ¶8.2. In 2005, Kanyongolo reported that the Legal Aid department had only 10 lawyers. 
KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 112.  
34McQuoid-Mason, supra note 29, at ¶8.1. McQuoid-Mason observed that at the time of his study, 
Legal Aid had five vehicles, four of which were “beyond repair and not used.” Id. at ¶8.3. 
35 Id. at ¶8.5. 
36 2006, one report estimated that fewer than ten percent of criminal defendants were represented at 
trial. KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 112. 
37 CONSTITUTION OF MALAWI, § 42(2)(f)(v).  
38 KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 112.  




are often inexperienced and poorly trained, and turnover is high.39 In March 2016, 
the Legal Aid Bureau announced that it had run out of money and could no longer 
represent indigent criminal defendants in homicide cases.40 
English is the official language of the courts, although only one percent of 
the country’s population understands it.41 Interpretation is typically provided by the 
court clerk, who simultaneously transcribes the proceedings (in longhand).  
 
II. LESSONS LEARNED—AND RE-LEARNED 
Working in Malawi has never been easy for me. To get there, my students 
and I take an exhausting and expensive series of flights over two full days. Working 
conditions are less than ideal. We have twice run training conferences with no 
electricity at all. During catastrophic flooding in early 2015, we had no running 
water for two days. Malawians have a flexible concept of time, and the lack of a 
reliable internet network makes communication difficult—factors that make it 
challenging to organize our work in advance of our visits. My students and I have 
periodically fallen sick, mainly from food and water-borne bacteria. We are at risk 
of exposure to tuberculosis and other diseases through our work in the prisons, and 
malaria is a constant concern. But the work has a profound impact on both the 
students who are fortunate enough to travel to Malawi, as well as on the prison 
population we serve.  
Over the course of the twelve years that I have worked in Malawi, I have 
learned a great deal about the challenges of direct engagement with a foreign legal 
system in one of the poorest countries in the world. This section describes three 
situations that illustrate the ethical, moral, and pedagogical challenges presented by 
our Malawi advocacy.  
 
A. Ethics, Shmethics 
 My first trip to Malawi was off to a bad start. I had gotten a stomach bug as 
soon as I landed, and was sharing a room with a student I didn’t know very well. 
One of my students announced that she was an insectophobe, and became slightly 
hysterical every time we saw a large fly or a spider. Another student had a panic 
attack shortly after we arrived.  A third student forgot his computer at airport 
security, and was inexplicably walking around without shoelaces. On our first day 
of work, when our local partner arrived to pick us up at our cockroach-infested 
lodge, two of my students had to be woken, as they had slept through their alarm. 
My stress level was, shall we say, slightly elevated.  
 After everyone finally piled into two Range Rovers, we drove to the offices 
of the Paralegal Advisory Services Institute (PASI)42 to discuss how we would 
                                           
39 Id. at 112–113. 
40 See Owen Khamula, Malawi Legal Aid Bureau Puts on Hold Murder Cases: No Funds, NYASA 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2016, http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-legal-aid-bureau-puts-on-hold-murder-
cases-no-funds/.  
41 KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 114. 
42 PASI is the premier organization of paralegals in Malawi, and perhaps in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
For a discussion of the role of paralegals in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Hammergren, supra n. 13, at 
140. 
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organize our work for the duration of our visit. PASI is a non-governmental 
organization that trains paralegals to educate prisoners about their legal rights. 
Their teams of paralegals visit the prisons every day, conducting interactive 
workshops using skits and role-playing to instruct prisoners (many of whom are 
illiterate) about criminal law and procedure. Over the years, they have educated 
thousands of prisoners, helping them seek bail and sentence reductions, and 
facilitating their access to courts. Their work has led to a dramatic reduction in the 
size of the remand population.43  
The PASI paralegals identified fourteen prisoners who had been held on 
remand for several years. Each was charged with murder, which carried the 
mandatory death penalty. None of them had ever spoken to a lawyer. Our task was 
to meet with the prisoners, interview them, and ascertain whether they were 
interested in pleading guilty if the prosecution reduced the charges from murder to 
manslaughter.   
Adam Stapleton, a British lawyer working with PRI, announced that the 
students would be divided into two groups. One group would work with the state’s 
advocates in the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Another group 
would work with Legal Aid. The group working with the DPP would review the 
prisoners’ case files and write memos analyzing the evidence in reference to the 
Malawi Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code. These 
memoranda would also recommend a course of action: either prosecution for 
murder, reduction of the charges in exchange for a guilty plea, or dismissal. The 
group assigned to Legal Aid would interview the prisoners and write up memos for 
defense lawyers based on the information they gathered. In cooperation with the 
judiciary, Adam and PASI had also scheduled court dates at which point the 
prisoners’ cases could be heard.  
I listened with growing dismay as Adam explained our mission. His plan 
sounded perfectly logical, except for the massive conflict of interest presented by 
his proposed division of labor. Clinic students would simultaneously be assisting 
both sides in the same case. Adam assured me that both the DPP and Legal Aid 
were fully aware of our work plan and welcomed our participation. Moreover, if 
we only worked for one side, we would jeopardize the prisoners’ ability to obtain 
prompt judicial review of their cases. He explained that neither the DPP nor Legal 
Aid had the capacity to staff the cases. Some of the prisoners had been languishing 
for years in pretrial detention, and if we didn’t take advantage of this opportunity 
now, they might not be back before the courts for years to come.   
At the time, I had no access to the rules of ethics governing Malawian 
lawyers.44 Malawi has an adversarial criminal justice system founded on rules of 
                                           
43 See Clifford Msiska, On the Front Lines: Insights from Malawi’s Paralegal Advisory Service, in 
OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, PRETRIAL DETENTION 2008, at 77–78. 
44 In 2016, I finally obtained a copy of the rules of professional responsibility that govern Malawian 
lawyers. Chapter 7 of the Malawi Law Society Code of Ethics addresses conflicts of interest:  “A 
lawyer must not act when there is a conflict or potential conflict of interest between lawyer and 
client unless the client consents and it is in the client’s best interest that the lawyer so acts.” CODE 
OF ETHICS ch. 7, r. 7 (MALAWI L. SOC. 2006). Our work was consistent with this provision, as we 
obtained the prisoners’ permission to act on their behalf, and it was in the prisoners’ best interest 
that we do so. 




procedure inherited from the British colonial regime.  Both defense counsel and the 
prosecution had not only consented to our participation, but actively welcomed our 
involvement. I decided that we could go ahead, provided that the students obtained 
the prisoners’ consent to our arrangement.45 I also forbade the students to speak to 
their classmates who were assisting the other party. The students reported directly 
to lawyers working for the DPP and Legal Aid, but they all came to me, as the sole 
faculty supervisor, with questions about their respective work.  
I randomly assigned the students to either the prosecution or legal aid. Those 
who had the task of reviewing prosecution case files were initially envious of their 
peers who were interviewing actual clients in the prisons. But they soon realized 
the impact they were having. One enthusiastic student wrote in her journal: 
I cannot believe it. I cannot believe it. The Director of Public Prosecutions 
agreed with the 3 opinions my team and I wrote. Oh my goodness. I can’t 
believe it. My head is reeling and I can’t sit still. Can you believe this? I 
can’t. It is amazing. . . . We are bouncing off the walls and can’t wait to 
dig into more of the files and write more opinions. Bring on the files, bring 
on the files. My team is ready to write opinions until our fingertips bleed. 
I do not want lunch, I just want another file. The more files we can review, 
the more opinions we write, the more opinions the DPP can review and 
possibly approve, and the more remanded inmates we can provide with an 
opportunity to have their day in court before we leave.46  
After one week, the students switched sides and began working on a new 
set of cases. Those who were formerly prosecutors’ aides started working with the 
defense, and vice versa. Once again, our local partners found this perfectly 
acceptable. Adam pointed out that in the United Kingdom, it is not uncommon for 
prosecutors to work simultaneously as defense attorneys (although certainly not on 
the same cases).47 But in the United States, I would have been fiercely critical of 
such a practice as inimical to the best interests of the defendants.  
By the end of our two-week stay, four prisoners had pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter and were sentenced to time served. All were immediately released. 
Two others were released on bail. In the weeks after we returned home, six more 
prisoners were released after pleading guilty. The students were ecstatic, and our 
local partners pronounced the project a success.  
I returned to Malawi a year later and replicated the same model, with similar 
results. But the following year, our partners requested our assistance with four 
capital murder trials. I explained that in the trial setting, my students would not be 
                                           
45 One of my colleagues insightfully pointed out that the prisoners’ “consent” could not be 
considered truly free and informed, owing to the inherently coercive circumstances of their detention 
and the lack of alternative options for legal representation.   
46 M.S., Student Journal (Spring 2007) (on file with Author). 
47 There is no universal consensus on what constitutes a conflict of interest. In her article on attorney 
ethics at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judith A. McMorrow 
describes a case in which a former prosecutor was allowed to join a defense team for a client 
notwithstanding his prior involvement as a prosecutor in two cases against the accused. Judith A. 
McMorrow, Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in International Tribunals: A Case Study of the 
ICTY, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 139, 164 (2007).  
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able to assist both sides. This time, we worked exclusively with the defense, 
interviewing the prisoners, conducting investigations, and transporting witnesses to 
court. The legal aid lawyers had not even spoken to their clients before we arrived 
and had done no investigation. We prepped the cases during our first week in the 
country, and the capital trials were held during the second week.48  
So why was it acceptable for the students to work on both sides of the fence 
when we were negotiating guilty pleas, but not when we went to trial? As an initial 
matter, the negotiation process is less adversarial than a trial. Both sides were 
working together to settle the cases. Although pretrial negotiations are certainly 
part of the adversarial process, the nature of a trial is fundamentally different. There 
is no collaboration, and each side works independently to develop a theory of the 
case, prepare its witnesses, and implement its trial strategy. Moreover, these were 
death penalty trials, and I would never have allowed my students to work on the 
prosecution side in a capital case.  
 As I write this, it strikes me that my decisions in the field were guided by 
little more than my internal moral compass, cloaked in flimsy rationalization. This 
is a danger inherent in human rights work, and one that has been noted by a number 
of scholars: there are few ethical rules that bind international human rights lawyers 
operating in foreign jurisdictions.49 Are we, in essence, acting as cowboy lawyers, 
free-wheeling through a foreign jurisdiction where we make up the rules as we go 
along?  
 I think not. At all times, we acted in accordance with the requests of our 
local partners, consistent with local practices and customs. In 2006—one year 
before our first Malawi trip—an independent consultant noted that there was a 
backlog of 500 homicide cases in Malawi.50 At the time, paralegals and legal interns 
were “drafting alternative murder and manslaughter charges and recommendations 
for consideration by the DPP” in an attempt to clear the backlog.51 The DPP 
                                           
48 The idea that clinic students would help investigate and defend four capital murder cases over the 
course of two weeks would undoubtedly raise eyebrows in the U.S. capital defense community. This 
illustrates another conundrum inherent in the clinic’s Malawi work: we never have the time or the 
resources to handle cases in accordance with established guidelines for capital case representation. 
See generally American Bar Association: Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003). Notwithstanding these 
constraints, the results were positive: one defendant was acquitted, the prosecution dismissed the 
charges against another, one pleaded guilty and received a 5-year sentence, and a fourth was 
convicted and sentenced to 15 years.  
49 See Laura Notess, Current Developments 2013–2014: Preserving the Human in Human Rights: 
Incorporating Informed Consent into the Work of International Human Rights NGOs, 27 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 765 (2014); Nell Moley, Confronting the Challenges of Ethical Accountability in 
International Human Rights Lawyering, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 359, 361—64 (2014); Caroline 
Bettinger-Lopez et. al, Redefining Human Rights Lawyering Through the Lens of Critical Theory: 
Lessons for Pedagogy and Practice, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 337, 384 (2011). On the 
ethical hazards of international legal practice generally (without focusing explicitly on human rights 
practice), see Robert E. Lutz, Ethics and International Practice: A Guide to the Professional 
Responsibilities of Practitioners, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 53 (1992/1993); Detlev Vagts, 
International Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 378, 378 
(1998). 
50 McQuoid-Mason supra note 29 at ¶6.2.  
51 Id. at ¶21.5. 




requested, and the consultant recommended, that donors provide funding for twenty 
legal interns to assist prosecutors in processing the homicide cases. Our work was 
in line with ongoing efforts to ensure access to justice for prisoners and filled an 
unmet need in the Malawian legal system.  
 As noted above, all of our partners not only consented to this arrangement 
but welcomed our participation. Their informed consent was critical to my decision 
to set aside concerns over the clinic team’s conflict of interest. The Model Rules of 
Professional Responsibility allow lawyers to represent parties with adverse 
interests if the client provides informed consent,52 and scholars have emphasized 
the centrality of informed consent to international human rights advocacy.53 As 
Notess points out, “Because informed consent resonates both with principles found 
in the Model Rules and with general human rights values such as voice and 
participation, it can provide an important means for American lawyers to consider 
international legal ethical issues.”54 
Was our facilitation of plea agreements consistent with international best 
practices? Clearly not. Students in the same clinic should not be obtaining 
privileged information from prisoners, while other students simultaneously advise 
the prosecution on a course of action in the prisoner’s case that best serves the 
public interest. The greatest problem lay in my supervision of both sides. 
Technically, the students reported to senior prosecutors and legal aid attorneys. But 
I was aware of the work that each side was conducting, and I reviewed each memo 
written by the students assisting the prosecution. Had there been two supervisors, 
and two teams of students that maintained a strict separation, the arrangement 
would have been far less problematic. But at the time, I felt I owed a pedagogical 
duty of supervision to my students since I had no way to gauge the quality of 
instruction they would receive from our Malawian partners.  
This created a significant pedagogical challenge that, as a new clinical 
professor, I struggled to address. With my students, I was frank about the conflict 
and my discomfort with the situation, explaining that there was a difference 
between “best practices” in the United States and “best practices under the 
circumstances” in Malawi. But to a large extent, my teaching “moment” was lost 
to my own confusion about whether what we were doing was ethical. In my early 
days of teaching, I was less inclined to share my own apprehensions with my 
students, as I thought I needed to project confidence and leadership. Today, I would 
handle it slightly differently, by creating greater opportunities for discussion about 
the issue at hand with students and partners alike. 
Would I do it again? Yes—although I would be sure to bring two 
supervisors so that we could have a stricter separation between the two sides. This 
would not only be consistent with Malawi’s ethical rules55 but with broader 
                                           
52 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, r. 1.7. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).  
53 Cf. Notess, supra note 49, at 775 (advocating for the adoption of an informed consent standard in 
international human rights litigation). Notess observes, however, that clients in civil law countries 
generally cannot waive conflicts of interest, even if they expressly wish to do so. Id. at 777. 
54 Id. at 777. 
55 See CODE OF ETHICS , supra n. 44. 
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principles of moral choice.56 On balance, the “good” that we achieved—the 
liberation of twelve prisoners who had been subjected to cruel and inhuman 
treatment as well as arbitrary and prolonged detention—outweighed our potential 
conflict of interest, particularly given that all parties consented to our participation. 
This consequentialist approach57 may seem overly simplistic, but it coheres with 
the reality of practicing law in a country whose legal institutions are incapable of 
protecting the constitutional rights of individuals caught up in the criminal justice 
system. It is also broadly consistent with ethical principles promoted by scholars in 
the field.58 Finally, by giving voice to prisoners who were otherwise powerless to 
tell their stories, our clinic fulfilled what is perhaps the highest ethical duty of any 
legal professional: to uphold her client’s human dignity.59 
 
B. Advancing Human Rights, or Reinforcing Donor Dependence? 
 Anyone who works in Sub-Saharan Africa over time becomes accustomed 
to the particular vocabulary employed by the vast network of donors that underwrite 
development projects.60 As a general rule, legal reform work falls under the 
incongruous heading of “governance” assistance.61  When you organize a training 
workshop, you are “building capacity.”62 When you share your experience with 
                                           
56 See WENDEL, supra note 11, at 49. 
57 As summarized by W. Bradley Wendel in his helpful primer on legal ethics, “[c]onsequentialism 
is a moral theory holding that the right thing to do in any particular situation is that which will 
produce the best outcome, the greatest net balance of good over evil.” Id. 
58 The discussion of ethical constraints on human rights lawyers and NGOs generally takes place in 
a different context than the one I’m describing. Often, NGOs and human rights lawyers engage in 
advocacy without any formal attorney-client relationship with those whose rights they seek to 
vindicate. In the absence of any code of professional conduct to guide their actions, some 
organizations have adopted their own internal codes of ethics. See, e.g., Code of Conduct, INT’L 
FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-
reports/code-of-conduct/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); 12 Accountability Commitments, 
ACCOUNTABLE NOW, https://accountablenow.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/12Comm_Booklet_
SCREEN.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). One of the most comprehensive codes of ethics for human 
rights practitioners was developed in a paper drafted by Columbia law student Rachel Barish. Barish 
draws from the ethical rules that govern diverse professions, including international lawyers, 
journalists, human subject researchers, and NGOs, and proposes a code of ethics guided by the 
following eleven principles: exercise competence; undertake effective communication; maintain 
independence; engage in zealous advocacy; do no harm; protect life, health, and dignity; assess 
risks/benefits to the population; guarantee fully informed consent; ensure accuracy and objectivity; 
practice cultural sensitivity; avoid conflicts of interest; and take steps to ensure accountability. 
Bettinger-Lopez et. al., supra note 49, at 384 (citing Rachel Barish, Professional Responsibility for 
International Human Rights Lawyers: A Proposed Paradigm (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors)).  
59 See David Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting 
It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 815 (2005). 
60 Ferguson argues that the “development” discourse has profound political and social effects. JAMES 
FERGUSON, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: “DEVELOPMENT,” DEPOLITICIZATION, AND 
BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO xiii-xvi (1990).  
61 See HAMMERGREN, supra note 13, at 9. 
62 See, e.g., Organize Capacity Development Activities to Learn the Basic Concepts of Safe Cities 
for Women and Violence Against Women and Girls, U.N. WOMEN (Dec. 3, 2010), 




local partners, or aid in the drafting of a report, you are providing “technical 
assistance.”63 If you propose a short-term project that aims to address a particular 
need at a particular time, you may be chastised for failing to consider the 
“sustainability” of your intervention.64 If you draft a grant proposal, you must 
include the specific “outputs” that you aim to generate.65 I don’t mean to sound 
disparaging. The individuals engaged in development work have learned the hard 
way that projects lacking these elements will fail to achieve lasting change.66  
Malawi depends on international aid for about forty percent of its national 
budget, far more than is considered optimal by development economists.67 On a 
drive through the country, the visitor regularly sees billboards proclaiming that this 
school, that clinic, or this stretch of highway has been constructed with funds 
provided by an international donor. Local NGOs are completely dependent on 
foreign aid to survive.68  
There is no question that the quantity of aid provided has had a profound 
effect on local institutions, and not all for the good. In 2013, Malawi was rocked 
by a major corruption scandal in which public servants—including the Minister of 
Justice—were implicated in the theft of approximately 32 million dollars in public 
funds, or about one percent of Malawi’s GDP.69 Major donors quickly froze 
pending transactions, and Malawi spiraled into a political and economic crisis from 
which it has not yet recovered. So what does our clinic work have to do with all 
this? 
 The level of deprivation in Malawi—and its effects on the justice system—
permeates the nature of our advocacy and our relationships with local partners. My 
                                           
http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/378-organize-capacity-development-activities-to-learn-the-
basic-concepts-of-safe-cities-for-women-and-violence-against-women-and-girls.html.  
63 See, e.g., The Reality of Aid 2016 Report Theme Statement, THE REALITY OF AID (Nov. 24, 2015), 
http://www.realityofaid.org/2015/11/the-reality-of-aid-2016-report-theme-statement-technical-
cooperation-and-capacity-development-as-an-aid-modality/.  
64 See generally Ben Taylor, Who Wants to Give Forever? Giving Meaning to Sustainability in 
Development, 26 J. INT’L DEVELOPMENT (2014), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/
jid.3033.  
65 Understanding the Difference Between Outputs and Outcomes, PROFESSIONAL GRANT WRITERS 
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.professionalgrantwriter.org/understanding-difference-outputs-
outcomes.  
66 For a pithy description of the shortcomings of typical donor-funded projects, see Nancy Birdsall, 
Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings, in REINVENTING FOREIGN AID 515 (William 
Easterly ed., 2008).    
67 Jacey Fortin, Cashgate: Malawi Faces a Ticking Time Bomb as International Aid Dries Up Over 
Pervasive Corruption, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2013, 11:55 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/
cashgate-malawi-faces-ticking-time-bomb-international-aid-dries-over-pervasive-corruption-
1476658.  
68 Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle contend that because NGOs receive the bulk of their funding 
from donors, “they are less likely to seek to build up their own memberships, or autonomy. Because 
they help donors implement projects that governments fail to undertake, they actually help 
governments escape accountability for their developmental failures.” Todd Moss, Gunilla Pettersson 
& Nicolas van de Walle, An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and 
State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa, in REINVENTING FOREIGN AID 274 (William Easterly ed., 
2008). 
69 See J.O’S., The $32m Heist, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
baobab/2014/02/malawi-s-cashgate-scandal. 
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students have reacted to this in a variety of ways.  Upon witnessing the primitive 
filing systems used by court clerks, one of my students suggested pooling our 
resources to buy filing cabinets.  Others have expressed a desire to send second-
hand laptops or books to local lawyers. With respect to our clients and their 
families, whose poverty is wrenching to witness, one feels an overwhelming desire 
to do something to help—even if the effects are fleeting. This often takes the form 
of small donations for food, housing, or transportation.  Yet these small gestures do 
little to offset the feeling of helplessness that my students often feel in the face of 
overwhelming human suffering.   
For a lawyer with no technical or scholarly background in the field of 
development aid, I have sometimes struggled to explain why buying filing cabinets 
for every courthouse in Malawi would not solve the problem of missing case files 
in Malawi.  And my students’ responses are not so different from those of donors 
who have funded the construction of courthouses after observing the dilapidated 
state of courtrooms.70  Providing material resources offers a quick and easy “fix” 
for perceived problem.  What it does not address, however, are the less tangible 
obstacles to legal reform, including organizational incompetence, resistance to 
change, lack of ongoing training, and procedural rigidity.71 
 The first year I took clinic students to Malawi, it never occurred to me that 
our local partner—the Paralegal Advisory Services Institute—might expect me to 
provide funding for its role in our joint project. After all, we were doing work that 
fit comfortably within PASI’s mandate: educating prisoners about their legal rights 
and reducing prison overcrowding. I was oblivious to the added burden that our 
presence imposed. I didn’t see that every time they drove us to the prison, they used 
up some of their fuel supplies. I didn’t realize that when they copied case files for 
us, they used up precious paper and toner for their copy machine. And when they 
called me to discuss the day’s agenda, they paid for the “air time” required for those 
calls. If I had stopped to think about these expenses, I might have told myself that 
these were all part and parcel of an NGO’s daily work. 
 After our first visit, however, I asked Adam Stapleton—the lawyer working 
for Penal Reform International who had conceived of our project—whether I should 
make a donation to PASI in conjunction with future visits. PASI was struggling to 
survive, and their paralegals were doing heroic work. From what I could tell, PASI 
was the only NGO that regularly visited the prisons. By contrast, most lawyers 
never set foot in the prison, in part because they lacked transportation (or money 
for fuel). I also got the sense that some lawyers felt it was beneath them to spend 
time in prisons. The paralegals, by contrast, knew the prisoners by name and treated 
them with dignity and respect, even risking their own health to help the prisoners 
vindicate their rights.  
                                           
70 For an explanation of why the construction of new courthouses is usually not the most efficient 
use of donor funds, see HAMMERGREN, supra note 13, at 111. 
71 See HAMMERGREN, supra note 13, at 29.  Providing equipment and software to facilitate case 
tracking would seem to be another easy solution, but as Hammergren explains, most donors fail to 
ensure that aid recipients are using the equipment for its intended purpose, that staff are adequately 
trained, and that personnel are monitoring the quality of data entered into the system.  As a result, 
“the system ‘collapses’ for lack of attention.”  Id. at 94. 




 Adam thought it was an excellent suggestion, so on my next clinic trip to 
Malawi, I decided to allocate $1,500 to PASI as recognition for the support they 
provided to our team during our two-week visit.72 At the end of our visit, however, 
PASI’s legal director took me aside and suggested that in the future, PASI should 
prepare a budget reflecting its actual costs—which he implied were much higher 
than the amount I had donated. I agreed that this would be a sensible way to 
proceed. Consequently, before our next visit, PASI sent me a $2,500 budget that 
included allocations for the following: copy paper; toner; fuel for driving us around 
town; airtime for the paralegals’ cell phones; labor costs; lunch allowances for 
paralegals working with us; and the costs of servicing their vehicles.  At first, I was 
taken aback. It didn’t seem appropriate for us to cover some of these expenses. But 
Adam explained that these were standard costs that would be included in any budget 
submitted to a donor in conjunction with a development assistance project. 
Moreover, I learned that PASI was completely dependent on donor aid for survival, 
and that paralegals often went months without receiving a salary because of 
bureaucratic delays caused by donors’ own bureaucratic inefficiencies.73 
 I learned my next lesson in donor culture when my students and I organized 
a workshop on the rights of individuals with mental disabilities in Zomba, the 
former British colonial capital in southern Malawi. We had received a small grant 
from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to cover the workshop expenses, including 
travel and accommodation for out-of-town participants. We had invited a few 
individuals to the workshop who lived in Zomba, including a local magistrate 
judge. He approached me during a coffee break to demand a per diem for attending 
the workshop. When I explained that local participants would not be granted a per 
diem, he became irate. His expectation was that he would be paid for attending the 
training workshop, in addition to receiving training materials, a free lunch, and 
beverages. At the time, I found this both inexplicable and outrageous (particularly 
since he snoozed throughout the afternoon sessions). I have since learned, however, 
that it is not uncommon for donors to provide allowances—sometimes called 
“sitting fees”—for all participants attending conferences and workshops.74  
 But the extent to which the justice system depends on outside aid goes much 
deeper than these examples illustrate.75 Homicide trials in Malawi had long been 
funded by foreign governments, including the Department for International 
Development (DFID), the British equivalent of the U.S. Agency for International 
                                           
72 For the first few years that I brought students to Malawi, Northwestern refused to provide 
financial support for the project; I raised money for the trip from fee-generating legal services I 
performed.  After I noticed that Northwestern had prominently featured our Malawi work in an 
alumni brochure, I successfully petitioned the Dean to provide financial resources to cover student 
travel and other expenses. 
73 As Hammergren notes, donor funding to non-governmental organizations is often unpredictable, 
leading to complaints from organizations dependent on such funding to survive. HAMMERGREN, 
supra note 13, at 138, 146. 
74 As one article on the effects of aid policies observed, “The common practice of paying cash 
‘sitting fees’ for civil servants attending donor-funded workshops, where the daily rates can exceed 
regular monthly salaries, even turns training into a rent to be distributed.” Moss, Pettersson & van 
de Walle, supra note 68, at 263.  
75 See KANYONGOLO, supra note 4, at 10. 
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Development (USAID).76 When aid dried up in the late 2000s, homicide trials 
stopped—and the prison population skyrocketed. When aid resumed, the courts 
continued holding trials.77  
The clinic has played a direct role in perpetuating this donor-dependent 
system. In November 2012 and November 2013, our clinic participated in “camp 
courts” in Kasungu prison, about two hours north of the nation’s capital. Camp 
courts are an innovative response to prison overcrowding.78 Magistrates, who hear 
misdemeanor and felony matters (with the exception of homicide and treason 
cases), travel to the prisons along with their clerks to hear bail arguments on behalf 
of the prisoners.79 The prisoners are unrepresented at these hearings. They cannot 
afford legal representation, and as noted above, the right to free legal aid is only 
recognized in homicide cases. There are often no lawyers present during these 
hearings: most magistrates lack a law degree,80 while the prosecution is represented 
by a police officer, and the prisoners represent themselves. 
I had previously met with the presiding magistrate in Kasungu along with 
the local police prosecutor and PASI paralegals to propose that clinic students 
participate in a camp court. I suggested that the students represent the prisoners and 
train paralegals in the story-telling style of advocacy prevalent in criminal defense 
work in the United States. The prisoners would benefit from the students’ advocacy 
skills, the other participants would gain exposure to a new form of advocacy, and 
the students would learn valuable lawyering skills. Everyone thought it was a great 
idea.  
In November 2011, the day before the hearings, we traveled to the prison in 
Kasungu to interview our clients. We arrived at the appointed time for the camp 
court the following day, and I was informed that the magistrate’s car had broken 
down. I went to find him, and after the magistrate and his clerk hailed me down by 
the side of the road, we drove together to the prison. The prison officers took us 
through the prison yard—a dirt enclosure where prisoners played bawo,81 ate, and 
squeezed together in the sliver of shade adjoining one of the prison walls—and 
brought us to a small classroom. The classroom, which opened directly onto the 
yard, would serve as our courtroom for the day. Inside was a table and chair for the 
                                           
76 Malawi Abolishes Jury System in Homicide Cases, THE ZIMBABWEAN (Aug. 11, 2009), 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2009/08/malawi-abolishes-jury-system-in-homicide-cases/.  
77 Funding Delays 2,000 Murder Cases, THE NATION (Oct. 1, 2012), https://mwnation.com/funding-
delays-2-000-murder-cases/. The government eventually allocated funds in the national budget for 
homicide trials, but trials are continually disrupted by funding shortfalls. For example, in 2016 the 
Director of the Legal Aid Bureau informed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court that his office 
would no longer represent defendants in homicide trials, as they had not received necessary funding 
from the state. Jameson Chauluka, No Money for Murder Cases, TIMES ONLINE (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.times.mw/no-money-for-murder-cases/. 
78 Camp Courts, Malawi, IRISH RULE OF LAW: INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://irishruleoflaw.ie/camp-courts-malawi/.  
79 Id. In recent years, High Court judges have begun to conduct camp courts as well. See Gabriel 
Kamlomo, Malawi Judge Releases 84 Prisoners from 1 Prison, ZODIAK ONLINE (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://zodiakmalawi.com/malawi-national-news/malawi-judge-releases-84-prisoners-from-1-
prison. 
80 McQuoid-Mason, supra note 29, at ¶7.7. 
81 Bawo is a variation on the game known in the United States as mancala. 




magistrate and clerk, and benches for the police-prosecutor, the detainees, and the 
students. 
The students represented a total of eight prisoners. They sat waiting their 
turn in the dirt outside our “courtroom.” As each case was called, the prisoner 
entered barefoot and took his place on a bench sandwiched between a student and 
a paralegal. As each case was called, a student stood up and argued why her client 
was entitled to be released on bail. The magistrate listened attentively to each, 
occasionally asking questions, while the court clerk translated the arguments into 
Chichewa for the prisoners. Curious prisoners occasionally poked their heads 
inside.  At the end of the day, the magistrate signed orders directing the immediate 
release of three prisoners. The students were thrilled, the prisoners were grateful, 
and all of the local participants praised the students’ work and expressed a desire 
to repeat the exercise.  
As we left the prison, I noticed the PASI paralegal handing out stacks of 
Malawian kwacha (the local currency) to the magistrate, his clerk, and the police 
prosecutor. My students noticed as well, and in whispers, asked what was going on. 
Later, our paralegal partner explained that after every camp court, the participants 
received allowances for lunch and transport costs—even if they lived locally, and 
even though participation in bail hearings fell squarely within the job description 
of those involved. The funds that PASI distributed came out of the money that the 
clinic had given PASI to organize and provide support for our clinic work.  
From an American lawyer’s perspective, this practice raised uncomfortable 
questions about the relationship between money and justice. I have no reason to 
believe that the magistrate’s receipt of what is called, in local parlance, a “daily 
subsistence allowance,” affected his evaluation of the merits of each argument. 
These were not bribes. They were (and are) a standard aspect of the criminal justice 
system in Malawi.82 And in the United States, it can hardly be said that money plays 
no role in the quality of justice received by individual defendants.83 At least in 
Malawi, the funding we provided served a group of defendants who were all equally 
poor and equally deserving of access to the courts. Nevertheless, it was 
disconcerting to see money passing hands to those entrusted with the administration 
of justice.  
 The clinic became fully immersed in the local donor culture when, in 2012, 
my students and I drafted a funding proposal on behalf of our local partner, the 
Malawi Human Rights Commission, for a large-scale project designed to 
implement Kafantayeni and Others v. Attorney General, a 2007 judgment of the 
Malawi High Court striking down the mandatory death penalty.84 Prior to 
Kafantayeni, the Malawian Penal Code provided that all prisoners convicted of 
murder or treason would automatically be sentenced to death without regard for 
                                           
82 Supra note 77 (noting that the cost of the average homicide trial includes “allowances for 
judges, the prosecution team from the State Advocate Department and the defence team from 
Legal Aid Department as they travel from one district to another for trials”). 
83 Leroy D. Clark, All Defendants, Rich and Poor, Should Get Appointed Counsel in Criminal Cases: 
The Route to True Equal Justice, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 47 (1997).  
84 Kafantayeni v. Att’y Gen., 46 I.L.M. 566, 571 (2007).  
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their personal background or the facts of the crime.85 But in 2007, following a wave 
of similar judgments in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Uganda, and elsewhere, the 
Malawi High Court held that the mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional.86 
In 2010, the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal held that all prisoners sentenced to 
the mandatory death penalty were entitled to be resentenced at hearings where they 
could present mitigating evidence relating to the facts of the crime and their 
individual life circumstances.87  
In the wake of these decisions, I met with the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, the Chief Legal Aid Advocate, human rights organizations, and 
judges from both the Supreme Court and High Court to explore how the clinic 
might assist in implementing the High Court’s mandate. Lawyers in Malawi had no 
experience with the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence, and 
judges had never had occasion to consider what mitigating circumstances might be 
relevant in the capital sentencing context. I thought we could contribute to the 
development of a workable model for the resentencing hearings. All of the relevant 
actors concurred that the prisoners were entitled to be resentenced. 
In 2010, in preparation for the resentencing hearings, my students and I 
interviewed approximately 170 prisoners who had been given mandatory death 
sentences. The Commissioner of Prisons gave us a week to complete this task. We 
arrived at the prison early each morning. The prisoners—many of whom had been 
incarcerated for decades—sat patiently in a line next to each student, waiting for 
their chance to be interviewed. Some were clearly mentally ill, others sick with 
AIDS, many weak and malnourished. We made no promises, but informed them 
about the Kafantayeni decision and our efforts to obtain new sentencing hearings. 
Yet, no matter how many meetings we held with relevant stakeholders, there was 
no forward movement. As of December 2012, only one prisoner had been 
resentenced—the lead plaintiff in the original court challenge in 2007.88 In the 
meantime, most prisoners lost hope, while others died. 
I finally realized that without funding, the resentencing hearings would 
likely never take place. It had seemed self-evident that the courts (along with 
prosecutors and defense attorneys) would take responsibility for giving effect to a 
binding legal decision by the High Court, which was later ratified by the Supreme 
Court. My erroneous assumption parallels the misconceptions of the “liberal 
legalist” paradigm that governed early scholars in the law and development 
movement.89 Like those early scholars, I believed that a change in the law would 
lead to a corresponding change in the law’s application.  Because of my 
inexperience on the ground, I assumed that local partners, having expressed 
agreement as to the desirable outcome, would take the necessary steps to achieve 
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it. What I failed to see was the lack of commitment and consensus as to the manner 
in which that end would be achieved—a failure common to many development 
assistance projects.90 As it turned out, without designated funding for investigations 
and court hearings, the parties lacked an incentive to make the resentencing 
hearings a priority.91  
In early 2013, the clinic drafted a funding proposal in collaboration with the 
Malawi Human Rights Commission.  The funding would all go to local actors who 
would be charged with implementing the court’s decision: the Malawi Human 
Rights Commission, the judiciary, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Legal Aid, 
pro bono lawyers, PASI, the law school, and others. The budget included, among 
other things, allocations for stationery; laptop computers; transportation; fuel; and 
accommodation and meal costs for judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and 
paralegals. It even provided for meal allowances and fuel costs for the prison guards 
responsible for transporting the prisoners to the sentencing hearings. The Malawi 
Human Rights Commission agreed to serve as coordinator for the project.  
Tilitonse, a Malawian grant-making authority supported by a group of 
European governments, approved our proposal in late 2013. The allocation of 
funding for what became known as the “Kafantayeni Resentencing Project” was 
transformative. Stakeholder meetings were held, plans were made, and things 
seemed to be moving forward. The clinic helped organize a series of trainings for 
lawyers, judges, paralegals, prison officers, and mental health workers on the nature 
and relevance of mitigating evidence to capital sentencing decisions. Working with 
the London-based NGO Reprieve and PASI, the clinic coordinated investigations 
into the life history of each prisoner. We brought in mental health experts from the 
United States and South Africa to assess over twenty-five prisoners who seemed to 
be mentally ill or intellectually disabled. Working closely with Malawian attorneys 
and international legal fellows funded by Reprieve, clinic students drafted legal 
arguments in support of reduced sentences in dozens of cases.  
We prioritized the cases of the most vulnerable prisoners, including those 
who were sick, elderly, or very youthful at the time of the offense for which they 
were sentenced to death. After investigation, we discovered that a number of 
prisoners were juveniles at the time of the offense—a fact that should have 
exempted them from the death penalty altogether. Others were innocent of the 
crimes for which they had been convicted.  Many had caused the death of another 
human being, but under circumstances that mitigated the severity of the offense. 
For example, several had been condemned to die for killing persons who had 
attacked their loved ones.  
In preparing for the resentencing process, the Malawi judiciary adopted 
several innovative procedures to expedite the hearings. For example, all of the 
hearings were held in Zomba, the former colonial capital where the maximum 
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(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Paper No. 34, 2003) (“[A]id providers 
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security prison was located. The courts agreed to accept evidence by affidavit, 
rather than requiring the defense to bring in live witnesses—a concession that made 
it possible to conduct the hearings within the budget approved by Tilitonse. A strike 
by the judiciary support staff derailed the project in late 2014, as the courts closed 
down completely for two months.92 But in February 2015, the courts finally began 
to hold the first hearings.93 
The first prisoners were released in February 2015. The news of their release 
traveled quickly through the prison. Prison officers reported that as the prisoners 
began to hope that their sentences would be reduced, their behavior improved. The 
prison officers themselves became the strongest supporters of the resentencing 
project. They provided affidavits attesting to the good behavior of nearly every 
prisoner and celebrated with us at the news of each release. They informed us when 
prisoners were mentally or physically unwell. Their concern for the prisoners 
contrasted starkly with the hostility and distrust that marks relations between prison 
guards and prisoners in the United States.94  
By September 2018, the courts had conducted resentencing hearings in all 
but a handful of cases.  The great majority of prisoners received dramatically 
reduced sentences with the prospect of early release.95 As of this writing, 138 
prisoners have been released, and nineteen more have been given determinate 
sentences.96 Only one prisoner received a life sentence, and none received a death 
sentence. Less than ten prisoners are still awaiting resentencing.  
The project is viewed by many as a tremendous success.97 Innocent people 
have been freed as a result of our work, as well as many others who did not deserve 
to remain in prison. I am proud of the role the clinic has played in its development 
and implementation. But at the same time, the justice system’s dependence on 
donor support to implement a binding legal judgment is deeply troubling. 
There is a voluminous literature in the field of development economics and 
political science that discusses the paradox of foreign aid.98 Most of the literature 
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discusses the failure of foreign aid programs to achieve their desired objectives; 
namely, economic growth. Relatively little scholarship has focused on the effects 
of development aid on the justice sector.99 This lack of scholarly attention is in part 
attributable to the relatively low level of international aid devoted to the justice 
sector in comparison to the health, environmental, educational, transport, 
communication and agricultural sectors.100 In addition, many legal scholars lack the 
practical experience and time to reflect on the complex array of factors that affect 
the outcomes of rule-of-law projects.101 
I question the relevance of certain aspects of the development aid paradigm 
to our clinic work. We are not a donor agency like the World Bank or IMF, and our 
work should not be judged by the same standards. Moreover, our clinic provides 
client-centered legal services, and I’m resistant to the idea that our work should be 
judged by our success or failure in achieving institutional reform. This perspective 
is consistent with the perspective of many other international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) and institutions that engage in human rights advocacy, who 
tend not to conceptualize their projects as a form of development aid.102 
Nevertheless, some foreign aid agencies would view our Malawi project as falling 
within the category of “law reform,”103 and it is worth reflecting on whether our 
clinic’s engagement in Malawi has helped perpetuate a donor-driven, aid-
dependent culture. 
Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle have observed that large aid flows can 
reduce governmental accountability:104 “A reliance on aid as a substitute for local 
resources means the flow of revenues to the state is not affected by government 
efficiency, so there will be a tendency for governments to underinvest in 
developmental capacity.”105 The authors describe this as a “moral hazard” effect of 
aid dependence.106 A related critique posits that aid reduces a government’s 
incentive to adopt good policies and reform inefficient institutions.107 A number of 
scholars have found that governments actually spend less on certain sectors when 
donor funding is made available, particularly when the donor’s priorities are not 
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106 Id. at 268.  
107 See Peter S. Heller & Sanjeev Gupta, Challenges in Expanding Development Assistance, 20 (IMF 
Policy Discussion Paper, Working Paper No. 02/5, 2002).  
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shared by the recipient government.108 This is sometimes referred to as the 
“fungibility” of aid.109  
 In the context of our clinic’s work, it could easily be argued that the influx 
of external funding for the Kafantayeni Resentencing Project removed any 
incentive for the state to build institutional capacity to implement the Kafantayeni 
judgment. Put differently, our project absolved the government of its responsibility 
to allocate necessary funding to the justice sector that would enable the courts, legal 
aid, and the prosecution to meet international fair trial standards in death penalty 
cases. Moreover, our project arguably allowed the government to escape 
accountability for its failure to comply with the rule of law.  
Although the resources that our clinic has brought to the Malawian justice 
sector may have provided a disincentive for the state to allocate funding for 
resentencing hearings, the likelihood that the government would have devoted the 
necessary resources to securing justice for murder convicts was exceedingly 
remote.110 For this reason, the concerns raised by development economists over the 
fungibility of aid are largely inapplicable.111 In other words, the funding we 
obtained for the resentencing hearings likely had no effect on budgetary allocations 
for this purpose, since no allocations were forthcoming. Improving access to justice 
for prisoners is never high on any government’s priority list, particularly in a 
country whose population is constantly at risk of famine and where HIV prevalence 
rates stand at 9.2% of the adult population.112 If we had stood by and waited for the 
justice sector to find its own solution, dozens of men and women—some of them 
wrongly convicted of crimes they did not commit—would have died in prison.113 
As it stands, 10 prisoners died between 2009 and the start of resentencing hearings 
in 2015.  
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The response to this argument, however, is that governments should be free 
to make these judgments for themselves.114 If a government decides that its 
resources should go toward reducing food insecurity and implementing measures 
to prevent malaria infection in children, human rights advocates have no right to 
meddle in those decisions.115 Similarly, if the judiciary prioritizes the hearing of 
civil disputes and homicide trials over the resentencing of prisoners convicted many 
years ago, that is a decision of theirs alone.116  
The international donor community has been harshly criticized for setting 
priorities without regard to local concerns.117 A number of scholars have framed 
the debate over priority setting as a question of legitimacy.118 Kapiriri lists a number 
of factors that undermine the legitimacy of donors’ tendency to set priorities 
without local input:  
(i) [M]ost of these organizations are not elected or appointed by the host 
countries, (ii) they are not representative of the general population they 
seek to serve, (iii) in most cases, they lack any legal frameworks for their 
activities and (iv) sometimes they may not conform to or respect the local 
values and norms.119  
Both Kapiriri and Lister conclude that legitimacy is directly related to the degree 
of “representativeness” of the institution engaged in strategic decision-making.120 
In the field of NGO advocacy, this “relates to the right to represent and the consent 
of the represented.”121  
Here again, Kapiri and Lister’s challenge seems only marginally relevant to 
our clinic work on behalf of individual clients. The prisoners affected by the 
Kafantayeni judgment gave us their unconditional consent to represent their 
interests (in conjunction with local lawyers). But if we view the Kafantayeni 
Resentencing Project as a law reform effort anchored to a larger objective of 
facilitating prisoners’ access to the courts, our intervention is more problematic. By 
writing a successful grant proposal for the resentencing hearings, our clinic diverted 
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human resources from other legal disputes whose resolution may now be 
postponed.122 
The tradeoff described above is inherent in any type of legal advocacy. 
What makes it more fraught, in the context of international human rights fieldwork, 
is that we are working within a system that is not our own. As an American lawyer 
working in Malawi, I have no  stake in the justice sector. Why should my priorities 
matter? I care about prisoners’ rights, and am deeply opposed to the death penalty—
passions that have fueled many years of litigation in the United States, where I take 
particular glee in foiling prosecutors’ efforts to have my clients killed as 
expeditiously as possible. But in Malawi, it’s different. In part, I think, it’s because 
Malawi’s legal system truly is struggling to survive. When lawyers say that they 
can’t visit their clients, it’s often because their office only has one car, and it has a 
broken axle. The salaries of legal aid lawyers are not high enough for them to own 
their own cars and pay for their own fuel. The budget constraints are real. 
 Alex de Waal’s critique of international humanitarian aid agencies focuses 
on the problem of accountability in a context that may be more directly relevant to 
the work of human rights clinics. A social anthropologist and human rights 
researcher, he has challenged the lack of accountability among what he terms the 
“humanitarian international.”123 According to de Waal, “the expansion of 
internationalized humanitarianism in the 1980s and 1990s reflects a retreat from 
accountability, akin to the dominance of neo-liberalism.”124 This “retreat from 
accountability” has two dimensions. As an initial matter, the internationalization of 
responsibility for humanitarian crises has reduced the accountability of local 
governments by shifting power to a vast array of non-governmental and inter-
governmental agencies engaged in the fight against famine.125 At the same time, 
this network of international organizations has no more than a “vague and easily 
evaded moral responsibility—nothing more than an aspiration” to accomplish their 
declared objectives.  Moreover, they cannot be “called to account” for their 
failures.126 “Moral outrage plus technical proficiency does not equal accountability 
for results.”127 
Granted, de Waal’s venom is directed primarily at the vast bureaucracies of 
the United Nations and large NGOs involved in humanitarian crises. But his 
appraisal of their shortcomings is undoubtedly relevant to NGOs and clinics 
engaged in human rights advocacy, especially since human rights clinics are a 
component of an increasingly active and well-financed international human rights 
movement. Clinics may choose their international projects based, in part, on the 
interests of their students and the priorities of their professors. They operate with 
little external scrutiny. If they deem a project to be unsatisfactory—either because 
it doesn’t meet the pedagogical goals of the professor, or for a host of other 
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reasons—the clinic may simply withdraw from the country. This, of course, is 
overly simplistic. Most clinical professors are acutely sensitive to the importance 
of responding to local needs and seek to avoid imposing their own agendas on 
partners in foreign countries. But there is a core truth to de Waal’s charge that we 
lack accountability for our actions. 
Scholars within the human rights movement have leveled similar charges of 
illegitimacy and inappropriate priority setting against the human rights movement 
as a whole.128 As put by Makau Wa Mutua: 
[O]ften, Northern activists with little familiarity with the continent 
descend on the capital city, interrogate local activists and a few victims 
and fly back to the West to release and publicize their report. There is little 
continuing contact with local groups and individuals until the next 
mission. In the meantime, the experts from the North influence funding 
trends and choices and determine the issues and groups deserving of 
support. Usually, the advice to funders—most of whom cannot 
independently verify the information—strengthens the hand of the 
advisors and leaves them in a superior position against their African 
counterparts. This model represents the biggest long-term threat to the 
relationship between African activists and their friends in the North.129 
Other scholars have criticized human rights clinics in particular for monopolizing 
control over strategic decisions and exacerbating power imbalances between 
institutions located in the global north and their counterparts in the global south.130   
These are all valid critiques. My clinic has tried to avoid the pitfalls 
described by de Waal and Mutua by creating long-term, collaborative relationships 
with local partners on the ground. Over the course of the last twelve years, we have 
painstakingly built relationships with civil society organizations, prosecutors, 
defense lawyers, judges, law professors, and magistrates. We take an interest in the 
challenges they face and try to assist where we can. By visiting time and again, we 
have developed a deep appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Malawian justice sector. With regard to the Kafantayeni project, our Malawian 
partners controlled the funding and decision-making—even though the clinic 
coordinated much of the legal work along with an able crew of volunteer lawyers 
from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States and Australia. In 
Malawi, more than 40 judges, 20 paralegals, 10 prosecutors and 20 defense lawyers 
participated in the resentencing hearings and/or attended training workshops on the 
investigation, presentation, and consideration of mitigating evidence in capital 
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cases.131 While the clinic gave the project a much-needed push to get off the ground, 
the Kafantayeni project now has broad support from a wide range of stakeholders.  
Nevertheless, the clinic cannot avoid entirely the unequal power dynamics 
inherent in any north-south collaboration. One of my students, reflecting on our 
Malawi work in the context of Mutua’s critique,132 observed: 
What would happen, for example, if [the clinic] was not involved in 
assisting the prisoners in Malawi to help alleviate prison overcrowding?  
Would our clients continue to languish in jail forever, or would the 
overcrowding conditions eventually stimulate a pooling of resources in 
Malawi to educate and train more lawyers in order to have a functional 
judicial system?  This is a difficult question, and the most frequent answer, 
at least within the international human rights community, raises the specter 
of the Western “savior” and places [the clinic] squarely in that role – 
completely incapacitated by their inferior economic and societal 
structures, Malawi prisoners and their attorneys are dependent on [the 
clinic] to provide the knowledge, manpower, and “civilized” 
determination to assess individual defendants’ unique circumstances when 
meting out punishment.  Clearly, that is an oversimplification of the 
situation, but the savior-dynamic is certainly present to some effect.133   
This is an entirely valid critique, and one that is difficult to refute.  From a 
pedagogical perspective, it is essential to raise these questions with students, and to 
explore how we can best mitigate the risk.  From a tactical perspective, it compels 
careful, ongoing consultation with our partners to build a truly collaborative 
relationship—one that recognizes that each partner brings value and expertise to 
the table.134  
 
  C. The Dangers of Cultural Incompetence 
 “Cultural competency” is a term that has garnered substantial attention 
within the clinical community over the last few decades. The notion of cultural 
competence encompasses a wide skill-set, including self-reflection and awareness 
of existing biases, identification of cultural differences, and the development of 
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tools to bridge the gap between lawyers and clients from diverse racial, ethnic, and 
socio-economic origins.135 Educators and scholars have emphasized the importance 
of training culturally competent lawyers—that is, lawyers prepared to recognize 
and navigate cultural barriers with sensitivity and compassion.136 Workshops on 
teaching cultural competency are a standard feature at clinical education 
conferences.   
 In the context of international human rights advocacy, the notion of cultural 
competency is often linked to clinical work on behalf of foreign-born populations, 
including field work in foreign countries.137 As Janus and Smythe have observed, 
“the ability to effectively navigate culture is at the core of effective human rights 
advocacy.”138 This is undeniably true, but knowledge of its truth does not always 
translate into effective cross-cultural lawyering.  
 Over the years, my clinic developed close, collaborative relationships with 
a number of Malawian partners. Everything we do on the ground is linked to a local 
partner. My students interview prisoners alongside Malawian law students; they 
travel to villages to interview prisoners’ family members with Malawian paralegals; 
and they work hand-in-hand with Malawian legal aid lawyers to draft legal 
arguments on behalf of prisoners seeking sentence reductions on appeal. Students 
have also helped lead human rights training workshops in partnership with our 
Malawian colleagues. These experiences have helped to build our knowledge of 
Malawian legal system.  
 I have learned and applied many superficial lessons about Malawian culture 
in our work with local partners. Before every meeting, I remind myself to sit back 
in my chair, to assume the laid-back rhythm of Malawian conversations, and to 
listen between the lines. I have learned that Malawians dislike saying “no” when 
                                           
135 See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, 
Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 
(1993) (discussing specific techniques such as interactive video simulations, controversial readings 
and lectures, self-reflective journals, and small group discussions to train students to be conscious 
and sensitive to diversity in clinical practice settings). 
136 Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 33, 37 (2001). I am somewhat skeptical about our ability to teach cultural “competence,” 
because I believe that a lawyer’s ability to successfully navigate cultural barriers is heavily 
dependent on personality traits such as humility, patience, and tolerance. But I do believe we can 
encourage students to reflect on their own biases and beliefs that color their views of clients (and 
colleagues) from diverse backgrounds. 
137 Kathleen Kelly Janus & Dee Smythe, Navigating Culture in the Field: Cultural Competency 
Training Lessons from the International Human Rights Clinic, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 445 (2011). 
See also Paoletti, supra note 150, at 445-46.  
138 Janus & Smythe, supra note 137, at 452. Bettinger-Lopez et al. provide a useful definition of 
cross cultural lawyering: 
Cross-cultural lawyering occurs when lawyers and clients have different ethnic or cultural heritages 
and when they are socialized by different subsets within ethnic groups. Thus, everyone is multi-
cultural to some degree. Cultural groups and cultural norms can be based on ethnicity, race, gender, 
nationality, age, economic status, social status, language, sexual orientation, physical characteristics, 
marital status, role in family, birth order, immigration status, religion, accent, skin color, or a variety 
of other characteristics. 
Bettinger-Lopez et al., supra note 49, at 392 n.238. 
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they disagree, so I am careful to inquire about the challenges they foresee in any 
particular course of action. At the same time, my students and I continually struggle 
to understand and respond appropriately to aspects of Malawi’s complex and 
diverse local culture.  Kennedy describes this phenomenon in his 1985 essay, 
Spring Break, where he evokes “the activist’s sense of not knowing what things 
mean or where they are going in human rights work . . . and the ways our inability 
to know what [is] intrusive . . . [leaves] us confused about our connections and 
responsibilities.”139    
 The vignette that I am about to relate provides the starkest example of how 
cultural incompetence can not only hamper advocacy goals but can also endanger 
the safety of both students and our local partners.  
 In March 2013, prior to the start of the Kafantayeni resentencing hearings, 
my clinic was engaged in appellate advocacy on behalf of a small number of 
prisoners who had been sentenced to death. None of the prisoners were represented 
on appeal. I proposed to the Chief Legal Aid Advocate that my students interview 
the prisoners, review their case files, identify potential legal arguments, and draft 
the appellate briefs. One of the prisoners we identified was a man named Gift 
Nkwenda.140 When I first interviewed him in 2009, I noticed that he was disheveled 
and unkempt. He had never been to school and had difficulty spelling his name. 
Although we could only communicate through an interpreter, I thought he could be 
intellectually disabled. 
 Gift had been convicted of a particularly violent offense. In Malawi, most 
homicides are the result of spontaneous conflicts fueled by alcohol. The use of guns 
is exceedingly rare, and many deaths could be avoided if Malawi’s villages had 
access to decent medical care. Gift, however, had been convicted of killing his nine-
year-old niece. Her dismembered body was still in his hut when the police came 
looking for her. It was the type of crime that immediately gave rise to suspicions 
that Gift was very mentally ill. Yet we had no information about his life prior to his 
arrest, since his trial lawyer had failed to conduct any investigation. His mental 
status was key to our efforts to identify potential legal arguments on appeal, since 
international law prohibits the execution of individuals with severe mental illnesses 
or intellectual disabilities.141 
 The students and I discussed the case with the PASI paralegals. We decided 
that a team of two students and two paralegals would visit his village and interview 
his parents to obtain information about his life history. We developed a 
questionnaire that explored issues of poverty, health, his mother’s pregnancy, and 
family history of mental illness. The team set out for the village, while I traveled to 
a nearby city to give a lecture on mitigating evidence to Malawian law students. 
 On my way back from the lecture, one of my students called. She sounded 
breathless and agitated. She explained that they had just left the village, and that 
the interviews had not gone well. This is what she told me: 
                                           
139 Kennedy, supra note 12, at 1378. 
140 Not his real name. 
141 See Sandra Babcock, Capital Punishment, Mental Illness, and Intellectual Disability: The 
Failure to Protect Individuals With Mental Disorders Facing Execution, in DEATH PENALTY AND 
THE VICTIMS (2016). 




 The team arrived at the village, and after asking around, were able to 
identify Gift’s family home on the outskirts of the village. His parents were poor, 
even by Malawian standards. While many Malawian families have a small stool for 
honored guests, Gift’s parents had no furniture whatsoever. The team sat on the 
packed dirt floor. The students and paralegals explained the purpose of their visit, 
and Gift’s parents said that they would be happy to share whatever information 
would be helpful. 
 Soon after they began the interviews, the team noticed that village children 
had begun to gather around the edges of the dirt yard where the students were 
conducting the interviews. This in itself was not uncommon, but nonetheless the 
paralegals tried to shoo them away to maintain as much privacy as possible. Shortly 
thereafter, some women arrived, and sat down within a few yards of where the 
students were speaking to Gift’s parents. The paralegals could not persuade them 
to leave. The students noticed that there was some activity in the fields surrounding 
the house. There was also some shouting, but they didn’t speak Chichewa and 
couldn’t understand what was being said.  
 Gift’s parents had begun to share important information relating to Gift’s 
childhood. They explained that he had never been to school. He had worked to help 
his family by collecting firewood and catching mice, which the family would make 
into a stew to supplement their meager diet. He had a hard time making friends. His 
brother was severely developmentally delayed.  
Suddenly, the students were interrupted in their work by the arrival of the 
village chief. She was obviously deeply disturbed by their presence. She demanded 
to know why the students were talking to “her people” without having first sought 
her permission. She told them they had to leave.  
 At the same time, men and women had begun to gather around the team’s 
car. Some of the men, just returning from their fields, carried machetes. To the 
students, they seemed hostile. The village chief cleared a way through the crowd. 
The students and paralegals squeezed into their car with the village chief, and their 
visibly riled driver slowly backed out. The crowd parted, and they made their way 
to the chief’s home. Once they were away from suspicious onlookers, the chief 
explained that the villagers did not understand the purpose of the team’s visit. They 
feared the team was working to free Gift, and that he would be released back into 
their community.  
 The chief further explained that if the paralegal/student team had come to 
her first, she could have taken steps to ensure their safety and facilitate the 
interviews with Gift’s family. She would have brought the family members to her 
home, where students could interview them in privacy. In bypassing this step, the 
paralegal/student team had created a potentially volatile situation. 
 In the end, no one was harmed—although my students were shaken by the 
experience. For my part, it was a painful lesson in the limits of my own cultural 
competency. I relied on the presence and local knowledge of the paralegals to 
ensure my students’ safety, but failed to discuss with them just how villagers might 
react to the students’ visit. Similarly, we failed to discuss what measures to take to 
mitigate any risk. We agreed that in all future visits to villages, we would always 
meet first with the village chief. We also agreed that in most cases, the crimes 
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committed would not arouse the same degree of community outrage. Nevertheless, 
we refrained from conducting any additional investigation during the trip.        
 In retrospect, I think it was highly unlikely that the students would have 
been harmed by the villagers. On the other hand, after eight years of work in 
Malawi, I now have a much greater appreciation of the dangers of mob violence. In 
rural areas, mob violence is not an uncommon response to crime.142 Thieves and 
suspected witches have been beaten to death, and some of the prisoners our clinic 
has defended were convicted of similar crimes. Even accidental injuries can spark 
mob violence; for example, I have repeatedly been instructed that if I were ever to 
injure a pedestrian in a road accident, I should not stop, but should instead drive 
straight to the closest police station. Once, when I was driving with my students in 
southern Malawi, we saw a truck hit a woman on her bike. The truck stopped, as 
did we, to see if we could offer any aid. As I was offering to drive the victim to the 
hospital, people began pouring out of their shops and homes and running toward 
the truck. I saw them pull open the passenger-side door, at which point I got back 
in the car and quickly left the scene.143 
 I still send students into villages to conduct mitigation investigation, but 
only after taking a number of precautions. First, we obtain as much information as 
possible about the nature of the crime, when it occurred, the location of the victim’s 
family, and the degree of hostility between the defendant’s and victim’s families. 
Often, the paralegals will contact the village chief, as well as regional traditional 
authorities, in advance of their visit. Second, the students are always accompanied 
by a team of at least two paralegals. Third, they will always visit the chief in person 
before conducting any interviews. Finally, I no longer allow the students to conduct 
investigations in recent cases involving highly aggravated homicides. After 
implementing these protocols, we have not had any further problems, and the 
students often say that the village mitigation investigation is the most rewarding 
part of our Malawi field work. 
 
 III. THE MALAWI PROJECT: A MODEL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY? 
 Over the last two decades, the number of international human rights clinics 
at U.S. law schools has grown exponentially. As Hurwitz and others have 
documented, the first human rights clinics came into existence in the late 1980s.144 
As of 2011, there were 45 international human rights clinics at 42 law schools in 
the U.S. and Canada,145 including 13 out of the top 15 U.S. law schools in the 
                                           
142 See Surge in Mob Killings in Malawi Draws Serious Concern of UN Human Rights Office, UN 
NEWS (Apr. 16, 2016), https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/04/526022-surge-mob-killings-malawi-
draws-serious-concern-un-human-rights-office. 
143 Another driver took the injured woman to a nearby clinic. 
144 Deena Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human Rights 
Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 505, 549 (2003). 
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international human rights clinic. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, 
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rankings provided by U.S. News and World Report.146 In addition, there are many 
clinical programs that do not define themselves as human rights clinics nonetheless 
engage in international human rights advocacy.147   
Human rights clinicians have adopted diverse approaches to clinic project 
selection.148 Many early clinics followed the model of human rights monitoring and 
reporting pioneered by organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International.149 Clinics would partner with international or local non-governmental 
organizations to expose human rights violations through investigation, report-
writing, and media advocacy.150 Other clinics focused on the representation of 
individuals seeking asylum, highlighting human rights abuses in the clients’ home 
countries in an effort to persuade immigration courts that they were entitled to 
refugee status under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.151 Still others 
filed lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute to seek redress for human rights 
violations perpetrated against foreign nationals residing in the United States.152 
Today, human rights clinics are engaged in a wide spectrum of projects and 
cases both in the United States and abroad, to the extent that it is no longer possible 
to capture their work in a few short sentences.153 As human rights clinics have 
become increasingly commonplace, critiques of their work have inevitably 
emerged. On the one hand, conservative scholars such as Eric Posner have 
questioned the effectiveness and appropriateness of human rights clinics.154 On the 
other, progressive scholars have accused clinics of perpetuating the “dynamics of 
domination and subordination” that have long characterized relations between 
international institutions and local actors in the global south.155  
Human rights clinicians have also begun to engage in an internal dialogue 
about the merits of different approaches to international clinical work. Clinicians 
are increasingly questioning the value of short-term projects in which clinic 
students “parachute in” to a country with little consideration for the long-term 
consequences of their engagement.156 As Bonilla has observed, “these types of 
clinical projects are sustained by a questionable attitude rooted in the beliefs that 
                                           
146 Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://grad-schools.usnews.
rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings.  
147 For example, my colleague Angela Cornell runs a labor law clinic in which she has taken students 
to Cambodia to investigate unsafe working conditions. 
148 See, supra note 144, at 540 .  
149 See Deena Hurwitz, Remarks by Deena R. Hurwitz, 104 PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L 
L.) 95, 96 (2010). 
150 See Sarah H. Paoletti, Finding the Pearls When the World is Your Oyster: Case and Project 
Selection in Clinic Design, 5 DREXEL L. REV. 423, 437 (2013).  
151 See id. at 459-60.   
152 See Arturo J. Carrillo, Bringing International Law Home: The Innovative Role of Human Rights 
Clinics in the Transnational Legal Process, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 568-69 (2004); 
Hurwitz supra note 149, at 96.  
153 The wide-ranging scope of this work has been described in recent articles by Paoletti and 
Bettinger-Lopez et. al. See Paoletti, supra note 150, at 434-35, 437; Bettinger-Lopez, et. al., supra 
note 49, at 363.  
154 Eric A. Posner, The Human Rights Charade, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 17, 2014). 
155 See Bonilla, supra n. 130. 
156 See id. at 22–23; Bettinger-Lopez et. al., supra note 49, at 363; Jeena Shah, Rebellious Lawyering 
in Big Case Clinics, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 775, 791 (2017). 
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the legal academia of the Global North is so solid that it can produce knowledge 
after a tangential direct contact with the reality being studied and that a week or 
two is enough time within which to determine what the problems are, how to 
evaluate them and how to fix them.”157  
Ferguson echoes Bonilla’s critique, albeit in the contact of foreign 
development aid. In The Anti-Politics Machine, Ferguson recounts his surprise in 
learning that a development consultant was to arrive in Zimbabwe with no prior 
experience in the region.158 When he questioned the qualifications of the consultant, 
he was assured that “he knows development.”159 Ferguson observes that this sort of 
“free-floating” expertise, “untied to any specific context,” is characteristic of many 
development programs.160 In much the same way, a human rights clinic’s expertise 
in the field of human rights, when untethered to specific knowledge about a region, 
falls short of the contextualized knowledge essential for effective analysis and 
advocacy.161    
These critiques echo those of scholars immersed in the fields of “law and 
development” and “justice reform.”162  Yet, few clinicians have integrated this 
scholarship into their teaching and writing.  Human rights clinicians do not typically 
view themselves as being part of donor agencies—myself included.  But our local 
partners may well view us through the prism of their previous relationships with 
donor agencies.  Our work is also subject to many of the same pitfalls that beset 
donor/partner relations.  Linn Hammergen, a prominent international expert in the 
field of justice reform, explains that many efforts at justice reform fail because of 
conflicting agendas between donors and their local counterparts.163  “Doing this,” 
she emphasizes, “requires understanding the perspectives on the other side.”164 
Many human rights clinicians can also attest that signing an MOU with a local 
partner defining the parameters of their collaboration does not guarantee that both 
sides will approach the project with the same objectives. Similarly, consultants 
working with donor agencies:  
often arrive at the project site only to discover that their counterparts have 
little idea of what is intended, what their presumed role is, or what this 
implies for their usual activities.  Whoever agreed to the program may be 
                                           
157 Bonilla, supra note 130, at 23.  
158 James Ferguson, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: “DEVELOPMENT,” DEPOLITICIZATION, AND 
BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO 258 (1990). 
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160 Id. at 258-59. 
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162 The field of law and development emerged in the 1960s in response to the upsurge in 
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of development assistance tied to law-reform initiatives.  See Hammergren, supra note 13, at 211.  
163 Hammergren, supra note 13, at 203. 
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located organizationally far away from the targeted institutions, may have 
already left his or her position, or may have understood that agreement as 
only letting the donors spend their own funds on whatever they proposed 
to do. This happens in all areas of donor assistance, but is more common 
in justice projects . . . .165 
To avoid such misunderstandings, external consultants—like human rights 
clinics—must take the necessary time to build cooperation, consensus, and 
commitment with local partners—a step that most donors short-circuit.166 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of short-term projects, relatively few 
clinics have opted to limit their work to sustained engagements with a small number 
of partners in a single country. The reasons for this merit further exploration. Many 
clinicians have an understandable desire to expose their students to a variety of 
projects in different substantive issue areas. In specializing in one project or 
country, clinicians may be worried about “[r]isking [b]readth for [d]epth.”167 I have 
worried at times that my clinic may not attract the same numbers of students if I 
don’t provide a range of projects on different issues affecting different countries.   
 Nevertheless, there is much to be gained by a limited geographic focus.  
Hammergren notes that the potential for most clinics to effect long-term change is 
“severely limited” because they “frequently know little about the circumstances in 
which they propose to work.”168 She notes that clinics “working off a long history 
in a single country or region” are likely to be more effective.169  
Since student interest is a factor in maintaining a stable of diverse clinic 
projects, it is worth asking whether the Malawi model is attractive to students, and 
whether their engagement in a long-term project offers an experience that is 
fundamentally different from what they would receive in a semester-long project. 
This is, of course, is impossible to gauge with any objective measure. Short-term 
projects can be immensely satisfying for students, particularly when students can 
see the project through to its conclusion during the course of a single semester. 
Some of my students were lucky enough to witness the release of a prisoner whose 
case they had worked on—and this sort of positive “closure” is extremely 
rewarding. Early in the project, one student ended her journal with the following 
note: 
The morning that we received notice that 11 of the prisoners were being 
recommended for immediate release after negotiations between the 
defense and the DPP, and the fact that they had relied so heavily on the 
factors identified through our work, was one of the most gratifying and 
proud moments of my life.170 
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Another student, who had expressed doubt about the significance of her 
contribution to the project, expressed her happiness once her “client” was released 
from prison: 
I came back from our trip to Malawi feeling . . . frustrated that . . . given 
the short length of the trip, we did not accomplish as much as I had initially 
thought we would . . . .  Though I did form more of a personal connection 
to the work by meeting some of the prisoners, I was still unsure of how to 
measure my contribution to the project without having yet seen any 
tangible results.  
It was thus extremely exciting (and great timing!) that [my client] was 
released a week after we got back.  I was happy because I truly believed 
he should not be imprisoned for what he did, and also because I could 
finally point to a tangible outcome that I worked to produce . . . .  .171  
Another student expressed her gratitude for all of those who had worked on the 
project for years before her, while acknowledging the unique gratification that 
comes from seeing actual “results” in a project: 
I have to admit, I feel extremely lucky to be working at this stage of the 
Malawi project (i.e. results stage) . . . . As I work on these submissions, I 
see the relentlessness and hard work in every prepared document (i.e. case 
summaries, prisoner interviews, mitigating factors memo) . . .  I feel 
extremely honored to be writing a submission that encapsulates the hard 
work of the other individuals who have worked on the prisoner’s behalf.172 
While witnessing a client’s release from prison is a rare pleasure, students 
have also discussed the value of litigating cases within Malawi’s criminal justice 
system to fully grasp the barriers to justice there.  One student remarked: 
It was also very helpful to see why exactly getting things done in Malawi 
is difficult. It is easy to look at the tasks to be done through the lens of our 
limited experience in the US and say “it should be easy- why can’t the 
Malawian’s get it together?” But experiencing the difficulties in-country 
made it much more difficult to level that criticism. Cars get stuck in the 
mud, rides have to be arranged to economize on fuel, it is difficult to travel 
after dark, you have to focus on the availability of resources we take for 
granted: paper, internet, email-sharing. I think understanding these very 
basic constraints is incredibly important when making requests of local 
partners. That’s why I value the chance to see it. . . .173 
In reviewing my students’ journals over the years, there is often little to 
indicate that the length and depth of our engagement in Malawi affected their own 
subjective experience.  There are some exceptions, however. One student described 
a moment in the trip when she was thanked by a client’s mother for helping secure 
his release: 
As our eyes teared up together, I was overwhelmed by the sense of being 
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a part of something so much larger than myself. It was a wonderful 
experience working in a clinic with other students who shared my desire 
to do public-interest work, but in that moment, I was struck by how 
humbling it was to be part of a much larger community of people I will 
never meet who have all worked on the same project at various stages in 
time . . . . This experience served as a profound reminder that victories 
often only come after a series of small steps. It may be difficult to see 
progress or measure success in the moment, but over time, the incremental 
efforts of many different people can produce significant results.174  
Many of my students have likewise commented on the importance of relationship 
building. One student observed: 
I was struck by how willing the Malawians seemed to be about including 
us in their work.  I think I expected our purpose or motive to be questioned 
more than it was. . . . That’s one important thing I took away from the 
whole trip – the importance of building relationships doing this kind of 
work.  Trust is not instant, especially across cultures.175 
Another student, after describing the endless meetings we had attended with local 
partners, remarked: “This project proved just how important it is to establish solid 
relationships within the country in which you want to work.”176 Another student 
similarly observed:  “[G]etting to see how a relationship with local partners in a 
foreign country is built is, I think, one of the more valuable lessons I’m learning 
from the Malawi project.”177 Yet another stated:  “There were many lessons that I 
took from Malawi, but two stood out: the importance of building relationships and 
the importance of being creative while understanding the limitation of 
resources.”178 And when I read the following journal entry I raised my fists in a 
victory salute:  “[T]he goal is ultimately to empower Malawi’s legal community to 
create strategies and implement  reforms on their own, rather than for American 
lawyers to identify problems, swoop in to try to fix them, and then disappear 
again.”179 
 My clinic students also derive great satisfaction from representing 
individual clients. One student observed:   
The case of Mr. Mtambo was a great opportunity to participate in a true 
“human rights work” – I interviewed him; I interviewed his relatives; and 
I contributed for a man to hopefully be released from prison. There is a 
famous sentence in Judaism that says: "Whoever saves one life, saves the 
world entire.” I know I didn’t save the world, but it definitely feels like I 
made a difference; and it feels great.180 
Another student, discussing our Malawi work in the context of Makau Mutua’s 
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critique of human rights advocacy, observed: 
We have individual clients with very specific problems that we actually 
have the capacity to help in very substantive ways – i.e. winning their 
release from prison or a reduction in their sentence. These goals seem to 
be universally-recognized as important legal services to which efforts 
defendants are entitled.  And the value we are pursuing – fairness in 
punishment for individuals convicted of crimes, and the right of accused 
persons to present a defense – doesn’t seem to be so foreign that a non-
Western society would resist it.181   
Another student reaffirmed how client representation solidified her commitment to 
human rights work: 
[R]eally the most important thing that clinic did for me, was to connect me 
with clients, and to do so in a way that was really humanity-affirming. By 
putting faces to names and images to locations, it really brought life and 
depth to the causes that we’re working on.182 
This focus on direct client representation is different from the approach 
adopted by many early human rights clinics.183 For example, I have intentionally 
refrained from engaging in systemic challenges to government policy. Over the 
years that our clinic has been working in Malawi, we have consciously refrained 
from publishing reports or taking any steps to expose the inadequacy of Malawi’s 
justice sector. In the Malawian context, I believe that public “shaming” of the 
country by highlighting its abysmal prison conditions or unfair trials would have 
jeopardized the relationships that we worked so hard to build with government 
officials, judges, and other justice sector stakeholders. These relationships were 
crucial to obtaining the outcomes we sought for our clients. Moreover, given the 
paucity of resources in Malawi, the traditional human rights approach of naming 
and shaming184 would have been far less effective in achieving concrete results. By 
forgoing such an approach, we have been able to work closely with judges, 
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and non-governmental organizations to develop 
creative strategies to address entrenched problems.185  As opposed to traditional 
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monitoring, which “identifies and announces abuses,” 186 we have engaged in direct 
assistance to “propose solutions, and intervene directly in a country’s courts, police, 
[and] prisons.”187 While I aim to provide training and support for lawyers and others 
who may become agents for change in Malawi, our work is decidedly focused on 
obtaining good outcomes for individuals through litigation and other forms of 
advocacy. In this sense as well, it is vulnerable to critique.  
 Critical legal theorists Nitzah Berkovitch and Neve Gordon have argued: 
While legal accomplishments can sometimes challenge social structures, 
they are usually confined to mitigating the structure’s excesses (i.e., 
unintended results that constitute violations). Consequently, they often 
also end up strengthening the system itself, since by correcting some of 
the structure’s ‘dysfunctions,’ direct litigation helps produce the belief that 
there is an impartial system that adjudicates between parties and corrects 
wrongs. In this way it helps silence structural criticism.188 
Applying this logic, our clinic has lost a critical opportunity to expose deeper 
structural dysfunctions and governmental oppression of marginalized communities 
(in this case, the prison population) by litigating on behalf of individuals.  
This argument reminds me of some of the early debates over the value of 
pro bono legal representation of prisoners facing execution in southern U.S. states. 
Some advocates argued that lawyers should not absolve the state of responsibility 
for ensuring prisoners were provided legal counsel on appeal.189 If prisoners were 
executed without lawyers, it would only showcase the depravity of the justice 
system and hasten the demise of the death penalty.190 Moreover, states should be 
forced to expend as many resources as possible on the death penalty, since the sheer 
economic cost of capital punishment would deter lawmakers from expanding its 
reach.191  
Others believed (I among them) that the defense bar had a moral obligation 
to try to prevent as many executions as possible, even if it allowed the state to 
disingenuously argue that death row prisoners had been the beneficiaries of 
rigorous procedural safeguards.192 The complexities of this debate are beyond the 
scope of the present article. In a sense, it is not so different from the divide between 
“cause” lawyering and client-centered lawyering.193 The latter prioritizes individual 
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client objectives over those that benefit a larger movement. Where there is a conflict 
between the cause and the client, the client always prevails.194 
Drawing on the work of critical legal scholars such as Berkovitch and 
Gordon, a group of clinical professors has challenged the clinical community to 
integrate the lessons of the critical legal theory movement into project selection.195 
In particular, they have suggested that human rights clinicians (and others) should 
“choose projects, whether domestic or international, that go beyond the readily 
apparent violations, beyond the moralistic, and which provide opportunities to 
pressure hegemonic power and the consequences of the ideology of 
neoliberalism.”196 While I embrace many of the arguments raised by the authors, 
their suggested criteria for project selection strike me as overly ambitious. 
Moreover, when clinics are engaging in social justice work in foreign countries, the 
authors’ suggestion seems positively unwise. They cite with approval the 
conclusions of Vasuki Nesiah and Alan Keenan that “strategies designed to 
ameliorate human rights abuses are not likely to be effective unless they challenge 
hegemonic ideologies and dominant political structures.”197 But as foreign 
academics/lawyers/activists/students, are we really best placed to challenge 
dominant political structures in a country that is not our own?198 Can’t we be more 
effective in addressing discrete human rights violations that are within our power 
to ameliorate? I wonder whether human rights clinicians risk falling into the trap 
that has ensnared certain development aid agencies seeking to “transform” a 
country’s legal system (or agricultural output, or provision of health care services). 
In Easterly’s words: 
As far as the “transformational” approach, its ambitions are certainly 
understandable given the realities of poverty and suffering in Africa. But 
these understandable ambitions seem to have created an intellectual bias 
that exaggerates the importance and potential for benevolent action of 
outside actors, as well as exaggerating Africa’s negatives and inability to 
fix itself.199 
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Easterly instead advocates for more modest projects that can lead to positive 
outcomes.200 Experts in the field of justice reform have likewise urged donors to 
focus on a “problem-oriented approach” to reform, rather than launching “grand 
programs that at best build an ideal structure without necessarily fixing any specific 
problems.”201  At the same time, Hammergren notes that “small ideas” need to be 
grounded in a “larger vision (whether of the situation of a specific country or of the 
justice reform enterprise writ large).”202 
To be clear, I fully support critical legal scholars’ suggestion that clinicians 
integrate into the clinic classroom a discussion of “the political-economic and 
historical sources of human rights crises,” including neo-liberal economic policies 
and colonialism.203 I have attempted to do that by inviting guest speakers in the 
field of development economics, and by assigning provocative background 
readings. I fear my efforts have fallen short in this regard, in part because of the 
complexity of the issue and the need to cover so many other topics in the clinic 
classroom. But when it comes to clinic project selection—particularly in the 
African context—it seems somehow grandiose to imagine that my clinic could (or 
should) “pressure hegemonic power” in the countries in which we work.204   
Instead, I embrace projects that aim to promote the rights of individuals, 
even where it is uncertain that our efforts will lead to major systemic reform. When 
it comes to representing prisoners condemned to death, my aim is to prevent their 
execution and persuade a court to reduce their sentence. That, in truth, is the 
primary objective of our work in Malawi. If in the course of our litigation we are 
able to create ground-breaking precedent or influence policy-makers to implement 
meaningful reform, that is a bonus—but it is never the primary objective. As a 
client-centered lawyer, my primary objective is to ameliorate any harm my client 
has suffered as well as prevent future harm.  On the other hand, I do look for 
opportunities to create precedent and affect policy if (and only if) it is consistent 
with my legal strategy on behalf of a client, and only after ensuring those efforts 
will not have unintended consequences.205  
Representing individual prisoners also clarifies many of the moral 
ambiguities of working in foreign country.  For example, in Kennedy’s account of 
a human rights mission to Uruguay, he ruminates over his “standing” to investigate 
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human rights violation in a foreign country. He asks, “what right had we to be there, 
asking these questions? Why should the Punta Rieles prison open its files to us?”206 
But as a lawyer representing a client, these questions are easily resolved. The prison 
should open its files because we are representing a prisoner seeking recourse in the 
courts. We have a right to ask questions because the answers are necessary to 
properly defend our client.207 Further, by representing prisoners who have no access 
to legal counsel, I avoid one of the more common challenges raised by project 
selection; namely, whether clinicians should prioritize the pedagogical mission 
over the potential for service to a community.208 Individual client representation 
satisfies both criteria.  Finally, as Haynes has argued, engaging in client-centered 
human rights advocacy provides “infinite possibilities for teaching how, precisely, 
a human rights advocate can and must confront questions of imperialism, 
essentialism, reduction of a person or group to a state of Victim Subject, and the 
unreflective advocate’s potential role in essentializing the very persons she is 
purporting to help.”209  
 Another key feature of the Malawi project, which fulfills one of my criteria 
for clinical project selection, is that it fills a much-needed gap in donor funding for 
the justice sector. I have found that donors are generally reluctant to fund litigation 
projects. On the other hand, they are much more receptive to training programs and 
conferences designed to “build the capacity” of local police, prosecutors, judges or 
defense attorneys. Yet as others have pointed out, the problem in many countries is 
not a lack of knowledge, but a lack of resources. Prison officials that preside over 
overcrowded penitentiaries where disease is rife and prisoners are denied adequate 
food may be intimately familiar with the U.N. Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners.210 What they lack is the funding to construct additional dormitories 
and purchase necessary supplies of nutritionally adequate food—funding that 
international donors are unwilling to supply. Similarly, legal aid lawyers may know 
how to prepare a defense, but without funding for investigators they have little 
ability to track down witnesses and interview them. And without reliable access to 
law libraries, electronic databases, printers, and paper, producing a well-researched 
appellate brief becomes a daunting task. 
 My clinic has recently embarked on another long-term clinical project in 
Tanzania.  Building on the model we developed in Malawi, we are now partnering 
with the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) in Dar Es Salaam, the UK-based 
NGO Reprieve, the Pan-African Lawyers’ Union (PALU), the East African Law 
Society (EALS), the Tanganyika Law Society, Zanzibar Law Society, and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to provide legal representation to 
unrepresented Tanzanian death row prisoners.  I envision this as a ten-year project.  
I chose the project based on its potential for long-term partnerships, the unmet need 
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we will address (providing representation for those without lawyers), our ability to 
provide unique expertise that is unavailable locally, and the opportunities it presents 
for students to engage in direct representation of clients.  For the first two years of 
the project, we will focus primarily on building relationships with our partners, as 
well as with Tanzanian prosecutors, defense attorneys, government officials, and 
prison officers. We will also determine the scope of the project by gathering 
information on prisoners facing the death penalty, a process that will take years 
because those prisoners are dispersed throughout prisons in various regions. 
In the representation of each client, we will partner with lawyers from 
PALU, EALS, LHRC, or the private criminal defense bar.  Together we will 
develop an investigation plan and litigation strategy.  We will train paralegals on 
the mechanics of conducting capital case investigations, including interviewing 
skills training.  We will train lawyers in essential advocacy skills and international 
law regarding the application of the death penalty. And we will work closely with 
government lawyers on the eventual implementation of any favorable decisions of 
the African Court, beginning long before any decision is issued.  It is my hope that 
after ten years, we will have succeeded in obtaining favorable judgments from the 
African Court for at least a dozen prisoners, and will be able to work with the 
Tanzanian government to implement those decisions by removing our clients from 
death row—and possibly releasing them. In the course of that work, we hope to be 
able to train Tanzanian lawyers to be better advocates for their clients, and help 
prison officers, prosecutors and judges understand the relevance of mental health 
and mitigation in capital case proceedings. These goals are realistic with a long time 
horizon, but would be impossible to achieve over the course of one or two 
semesters. 
In reflecting on how best to describe my approach to clinical partnerships 
in the Global South, I have found Sarah Jackson’s conception of “transformative 
solidarity” to be a useful paradigm.211 Jackson explains that some human rights 
activists in the Global North view victims of human rights violations as “objects” 
of their solidarity, taking campaign actions “for people.”212 She calls this 
“charitable solidarity.”213 By contrast, activists that exercise “transformative 
solidarity” respect the agency of those whose rights are violated, taking actions 
“with [] people, rather than for” them, “to leverage each other’s respective strengths 
in addressing interconnected struggles.”214 Transformative solidarity presupposes 
a level of understanding and empathy that can only be achieved through deep 
engagement over a period of years. As Jackson concludes, “working in a 
participatory way that fully respects agency takes more time.”215 
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IV.  PEDAGOGICAL APPROACHES 
 Over the years, I have realized that our Malawi work is challenging to 
students on multiple levels.  Students must navigate significant cultural barriers, 
maintain professional standards despite physical discomfort, and accept their 
limited ability to effect change in a foreign legal system with severe resource 
constraints.  My students are often shaken by the poverty they witness in Malawian 
villages. They are horrified by the prison conditions.  They are frustrated by their 
inability to lessen the suffering of their clients.  And all of this can contribute to 
secondary trauma.   
One student described her first interview with a client in Malawi’s Zomba 
prison as follows: 
It was my first client interview in the prison, and I felt so much weight and 
hurt. As I contemplated the day’s experiences that night, I told myself that 
hearing sad client stories would probably get easier with time and that it 
was just my inexperience that made the process so difficult. But as I 
reflected more, I realized that I didn’t want it to get easier. I don’t ever 
want to sit with a client and hear a story of injustice and not feel a raw 
ache. I think the ability to harness that ache into effective advocacy 
probably improves vastly with time. And while I look forward to building 
those advocacy skills, I hope I never lose that fresh feeling of shock and 
anger about wrongs that I see.216 
Another described her feelings of guilt after returning to the United States: 
I’ve thought a lot about the men on death row since the trip, especially 
those who I feel are truly in there by mistake.  There’s a certain guilt that 
seems to come with swooping in to take their information down and give 
them a bit of hope that someone is working for them and then hopping 
back on a plane and coming home to necessarily think of other things, like 
finals.  While I feel like there must be more good than harm to come from 
this, it still nagged at me a bit.  We made sure to limit any expectations or 
hope by telling the men that we were unsure of what we could do or what 
would come out of the interviews but it is hard to believe that they don’t 
take some hope from our presence.  After all, most receive few visitors at 
all, let alone visitors who talk about their case with them.  With nothing 
but time to think and little else to hold onto, I fear they felt hopeful after 
we were there.  And now, as the days have passed by, I wonder what they 
feel – lingering hope, disappointment, anger?217 
I sometimes forget how disturbing it can be for a student to interview 
prisoners and witness their suffering.  I have been a capital defense lawyer for more 
than 25 years, and have been to more prisons than I can count. While I am far from 
immune to trauma, I no longer experience the same sense of shock when I speak to 
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prisoners and hear them recount a litany of humiliations and injustices. As a result, 
I gave little thought as a new clinical teacher to my students’ need to process their 
feelings. But for the last several years, I try to meet with the students every evening 
during the trip to discuss issues that have come up. I do this by means of a “circle 
process.” 
The circle process draws from Native American traditions, adapted for 
contemporary use in a variety of settings, from misdemeanor sentencing 
proceedings to therapy groups.218  During the circle process, a “talking piece” is 
passed from one participant in the circle to the next.  Only the person who holds 
the talking piece may speak, while everyone else listens. Talking circles provide 
space for students to share personal reflections with the group in a supportive, non-
judgmental setting. The “unhurried pace”219 of the circle encourages even quiet 
students to process their reactions to our work at a time when they are still fresh. 
While I encourage student reflection and engagement in our death penalty 
case work, my students are never primarily responsible for strategic decisions that 
affect the lives of their clients. In death penalty cases, it is professionally 
indefensible to allow students to make such decisions without significant input and 
consultation with their supervisors. Moreover, by assuring students that I have their 
back, I relieve them of at least some of the overwhelming dread that often 
accompanies capital litigation. This is vital, in my view, to minimize the risk of 
secondary trauma.   
It must be said, however, that my students miss out on an important learning 
opportunity because of my decision to assume ultimate responsibility for strategic 
decisions in their cases. In Where in the World is Dr. Detchakandi? A Story of Fact 
Investigation,220 a former Georgetown Law School clinic student describes her 
agonizing search for a critical witness in her client’s asylum case, and her 
frustration at her professor’s refusal to tell her precisely how to find him.221 At the 
end of the essay, the student acknowledges that by allowing her to develop her own 
strategy (which involved a good deal of fruitless effort before she found her witness 
and won the case), her professor allowed her to develop confidence in her own 
judgment.222 She concludes that if her professor had acted as her boss, it would 
have been helpful to her at the time, but would not have given her the opportunity 
to revel in her own creativity and resourcefulness:   
If, instead of being a catalyst and a resource, Phil had acted as our boss, 
Dan and I would probably still have found Dr. Dekyakandi, and we would 
probably have won the case. But what would happen the next time I had 
to represent a client, work on a project with someone, or undertake a 
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seemingly impossible task?223 
While I do give my students leeway to propose a case theory or narrative, and to 
conceive of investigative strategies, I would never allow a student to go out in the 
field without first reviewing her investigation plan and ensuring she maximizes 
opportunities to obtain information necessary for the defense of her client. And that 
means taking a more active role in supervision than is typically recommended by 
experts on clinical pedagogy.224 
    
             CONCLUSION 
Over the last twelve years, I have learned much about the nature of north-
south collaboration, the world of development aid, and my clinic’s role in a fraught 
political environment. For those interested in developing long-term human rights 
projects in a single foreign country with a limited group of partners, I hope that the 
Malawi project provides an instructive template. What follows is a short list of the 
lessons I’ve learned, with the hope that they will be useful to others contemplating 
this approach. 
1. There is no substitute for repeated country visits over a long period of 
time. Trust develops slowly. 
2. During each visit, take time to build relationships with current and 
future partners.  
3. Be flexible. Your objectives may not align with those of your local 
partners. 
4. Be open with your local partners about finances. When partners will be 
spending a significant amount of time with your team, ask them in 
advance to prepare a budget for your review. Understand that you may 
need to transfer funds in advance, rather than reimbursing them after 
the fact. Do not take for granted their ability to cover any expenses or 
provide materials (even copies of documents) without compensation. 
5. Bring your own portable printer, toner, and paper if you will need to 
print documents. 
6. Conceptions of time vary greatly by culture, and influence 
expectations of when meetings will begin. If students and supervisors 
are not aware of this (and even when they are), delays can lead to 
frustration.  
7. Be humble. You will make mistakes (repeatedly). 
8. If you are a human rights clinician, take no more than 4-5 students at a 
time. A larger group is difficult to mobilize quickly and can 
overwhelm local partners.   
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9. Promote trust among the team members through frequent meetings and 
team bonding exercises before the trip.  
10. Build in time for reflection with partners and team members 
throughout the trip.225 
In conclusion, I think it important to recognize the unique nature of every 
clinic collaboration. The success of our Malawi project is attributable as much to 
the receptiveness and creativity of our partners as it is to the quality of our 
advocacy. Whatever knowledge the clinic has imparted pales in comparison to what 
they have taught us. As one of my students observed during the first year of the 
Malawi project:  
While no doubt there are numerous complex factors that explain [our 
clinic’s] accomplishments, the conclusion that I drew was that, like any 
successful project, these achievements occurred because of a unique 
collaborative effort that thrives in the Malawi criminal justice system.  
Every person whose case was heard while I was in Malawi had been aided 
and supported by Legal Aid, the Department of Public Prosecutions, our 
clinic, Penal Reform International, prison guards, police officers, 
magistrate and high court judges, and the prisoners themselves.  If any 
piece of that network had been absent, less would have been accomplished 
and some Malawians would still be sitting in an overcrowded prison facing 
inappropriate charges.  In this way I see the Malawian criminal justice 
system as a model for reform in the United States.226   
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